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1 Introduction
This dissertation contains three chapters in the area of empirical labour economics. All the
chapters deal with the concept of wage mobility and how to adequately model it. The first chap-
ter focuses on the specification of a new functional copula model aimed at providing a better
measure of relative wage mobility than those used in the previous literature. The second chap-
ter applies this novel model to two countries, namely Germany and the United Kingdom and
specifically investigates whether wage mobility changed after the financial crisis of 2007-2009.
The third chapter more specifically concentrates on the influence of relative wage mobility on
individual job satisfaction.
There is general agreement among scholars on the fact that measuring wage inequality at every
single year does not allow to really understand wage dynamics over time within a country
(Friedman 1962, Shorrocks 1978, Atkinson et al. 1988, Formby et al. 2004, Bonhomme and
Robin 2009). This motivates the approach of the present thesis, which aims at studying the
dynamics of individual wages over time. In the previous literature, many studies focused on
inter-generational wage mobility (see for example, among the most recent studies, Corak 2013
or Chetty et al. 2014). However, labor markets currently appear to be characterized by in-
creasingly flexible and discontinuous career patterns, so that the interest in factors at the roots
of intra-generational wage mobility appears to be justified. There are two main approaches to
analyse earnings mobility (Dickens 2000, Jantti and Jenkins 2013). The first one considers the
distance between different individuals in term of their wages (absolute mobility), whereas the
second one analyzes changes in the ranking of individuals from one period to another (relative
mobility). The focus of the present thesis is on the latter definition. More specifically, the pre-
sent work is about micro-mobility, i.e. the investigation of which individuals experience larger
changes in their wage ranks. In Chapter 3 of the present thesis, we show that the impact of
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relative wage mobility on job satisfaction is far larger than that of absolute wage mobility on
the same variable. Moreover, we find that the individual cares about her position in the entire
wage distribution, not only about her position in a restricted group of peers. These findings
justify the approach followed in Chapters 1 and 2. In general, we expect positional mobility
to be rather high in the US, given that this country has been often defined as ”the land of op-
portunities” (Ferrie 2005). Indeed, Schiller (1977) finds a relevant degree of relative earnings
mobility among employed males in the US. A consistent proportion of low-paid workers is
found to be able to move out of their past position and obtain better-paid jobs, thus providing
evidence against the existence of a so-called low-wage trap (Schiller 1977). Hence, the study
of the degree of wage mobility of different groups of workers has relevant implications for the
evolution of long-term earnings inequality. However, the estimation of the degree of relative or
positional wage mobility poses a number of methodological challenges.
Many empirical studies tried to assess the degree of wage mobility within an economy by me-
ans of transition matrices derived from a Markov chain. However, this approach rests on some
restrictive assumptions. Transition matrices, in fact, result in loss of information at the indi-
vidual level, since they neglect income variations that take place within the same class. The
model also assumes individual homogeneity, which may lead to a significant underestimation
of wage mobility (Fields and Ok 1999, Fachinger and Himmelreicher 2012). Moreover, par-
tition of income into quantile intervals is not operated on the basis of some economic criteria,
but it is simply determined by the empirical income distribution (Schulter 1997). Bonhomme
and Robin (2009) apply a copula model to the ranks of the transitory wage component. The
joint distribution of the present and the past transitory component is modeled by the authors
via the one-parameter Plackett copula. The copula parameter represents individual positional
persistence and is a function of calendar time and individual explanatory variables (experience,
experience squared and five dummies, one for each education level). However, in Bonhomme
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and Robin (2009), the dependence of the mobility parameter on the past rank is rigidly defined
by the type of copula chosen by the authors. The goal of Chapter 1 of the present thesis, instead,
consists in defining a model in which there is a function controlling the copula and mobility is
defined as a functional measure, e.g. as a function of the past position in the wage distribution.
This approach, which is intermediate between the standard parametric specification (which usu-
ally results too restrictive), and the fully unrestricted approach (which suffers from the curse of
dimensionality), has been suggested by Gagliardini and Gourieroux (2007).
In Chapter 2, we aim at applying the new flexible model developed in Chapter 1 to a policy-
relevant economic question. In this Chapter, indeed, we want to analyze and compare the degree
of relative wage mobility before and after the latest financial crisis (2007-2009) in Germany
and in the United Kingdom. In the previous literature, only a few studies tried to perform a
cross-country comparison of mobility, in order to assess the role played by the institutional
framework on the degree of positional persistence. At a first glance, one may argue that the
lower the degree of Government intervention in the labor market, the higher the degree of wage
mobility. It is reasonable to expect that higher levels of labor markets regulation are associated
with a lower turnover rate among firms. Since job changes have been found to be positively
related to both upward and downward wage mobility (respectively in the case of voluntary and
in that of involuntary job changes), then high regulation should be associated, in turn, with a
lower degree of wage mobility (Siebert 1997).
In particular, we expect labor market flexibility to be associated with a higher degree of earnings
mobility. In a flexible labor market, people are free to fluidly move from one job to another,
as a consequence of changes in demand or in technology (Atkinson and Bourguignon 1992).
However, this hypothesis does not find confirmation in empirical analysis (Abraham and Hous-
man 1993, Cardoso 2004, Sologon and O’Donoghue 2011). Labor market features such as the
presence and the level of a minimum wage, the unionization rate and the degree of collective
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wage bargaining are not unambiguously correlated with a higher or a lower degree of positional
mobility (Cardoso 2004). Indeed, it has been found that wage mobility is remarkably similar in
Germany and in the United States, despite the relevant differences in the degree of labor market
regulation in these two countries (Burkhauser et al. 1997). Germany is the typical ”Continental”
European welfare state, where employment protection is strict and welfare benefits are relati-
vely high. On the other hand, the UK is characterized by weak employment protection and low
unemployment benefits. The UK has a low coverage of collective bargaining agreements and an
intermediate level of union membership. A legal minimum wage now exists in the UK as well
as in Germany. However, minimum wage has been introduced in Germany only in 2015. In the
UK, on the other hand, the Low Pay Commission was created in 1997 and its work culminated
in 1999 with the introduction of a national minimum wage (Metcalf 1999).
In a 2016 paper, Cockx and Ghirelli (2016) find evidence that the financial crisis that took place
in 2007- 2009 seriously worsened the career prospects of the young graduates. One can expect
that the effects of a recession are more long-lasting in a rigid labor market such as the German
one rather than in a more flexible context (like the British one). However, empirical evidence on
the impact of the financial crisis on wage mobility is still scarce. According to Rinne and Zim-
mermann (2012 and 2013) and to Caliendo and Hogenacker (2012), the German model showed
remarkable resilience during the Great Recession also thanks to the major labor market reforms
that had been introduced in Germany in 2003-2005. Implemented in four waves, the so-called
Hartz reforms targeted important areas that broadly affect the functioning of labor markets;
unemployment benefits and social assistance schemes were restructured and generally downsi-
zed and fixed-term contracts and agency work were massively deregulated. All these measures
lead to an improved performance of the German labor market in the following years. Indeed,
German employment remained almost unaffected during the Great Recession. Chapter 2 sheds
further light on the impact of different labor market institutions on the economic performance
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of an economy, by focusing on a single dependent variable, i.e. relative wage mobility.
Chapter 3 takes a detour towards the field of behavioral economics. This detour is important to
explain why the focus of the first two chapters has been on relative wage mobility, defined as
the change in ranks or positions from one year to the following one. There is a large number of
studies that look into the role of income in determining the degree of job satisfaction. Judge et al.
(2010), for example, reports that evidence on this theme is mixed; some studies found a strong
positive relationship between the two variables, whereas others reported no influence at all of
the level of pay on satisfaction (Judge et al. 2010). Some researchers also tried to investigate
the impact of changes in the absolute wage level on individual job satisfaction (for example see
Diener et al. (1993), Clark and Oswald (1996), Clark (1999), Leontaridi and Sloane (2004), Di
Tella et al. (2010)). However, in these studies wage mobility has always been defined uniquely
as the change in the absolute level of pay, i.e. they only considered absolute wage mobility.
Rank is usually regarded as a fundamental variable in fields such as sport economics (see for
example Macmillan and Smith, 2007) or education economics (e.g. for the university rankings,
see Marginson and Van der Wende 2007). The idea of positional goods, i.e. goods whose
utility depend on how much of them is consumed by our neighbors, has gained attention in the
economic literature in the recent decades (e.g. Frank (1991), Easterlin (1995), Stutzer (2004)).
The importance of rank for individual well-being has been proved in the field of cognitive
psychology (Brown et al. 2008, Boyce et al. 2010). However, to the best of our knowledge, rank
(or relative) wage mobility has never been included among the determinants of job satisfaction
in the past literature. This is precisely the purpose of the third and last chapter of the present
thesis.
According to the range frequency theory, developed by Parducci in 1965 in the field of psy-
chology, satisfaction will be predicted partly by the ordinal position of one’s wage within a
comparison set, i.e. by the individual rank. Therefore, we expect that there is a significant
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association between relative wage mobility and job satisfaction. On the other side, we expect
absolute wage mobility to have only a limited role in determining the degree of individual satis-
faction. Wage mobility may affect job satisfaction in two ways: first, since people are generally
risk-averse, they prefer to earn a stable income over time. Therefore, the higher wage mobility
is, the lower reported job satisfaction will be. On the other hand, wage mobility is often linked
to the concept of equality of opportunity. If wage mobility in the lowest ranks of the distribution
is high, low-paid workers will be able to improve their positions from one year to the following
one (Friedman 1962, Clark 2003, Clark et al. 2009, Bjornskov et al. 2013). Hence, in principle,
the sign of the impact of wage mobility on job satisfaction may be either positive or negative.
In what follows, it is therefore presented at first the development of a new functional copula
model, to be estimated with semi-nonparametric econometric methods (Chapter 1). Then, the
analysis of how relative wage mobility changed in Germany and in the UK after the financial
crisis is presented (Chapter 2). Finally, a contribution on the relevance of our main variable,
i.e. relative wage mobility, in determining the degree of individual job satisfaction, finds place
(Chapter 3). A conclusion section draws results and summary of the present dissertation.
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2 Wage Mobility: A Functional Copula Approach
2.1 Introduction
1 In recent years, the study of inequality and its evolution over time has attracted much atten-
tion both from the side of scholars and from that of policy-makers. However, there is general
agreement on the fact that measuring earnings2 inequality in a single year does not allow the
economist to draw general conclusions about earnings inequality within a country (Friedman
(1962), Shorrocks (1978), Atkinson et al. (1988), Formby et al. (2004), Bonhomme and Robin
(2009)). This is why, in this work, we analyse the dynamics of individual earnings over time.
The contributions of the present paper are manifold. On the one side, we specify and study a
new copula model, in which mobility is represented by a function instead than by a single para-
meter, so that the degree of mobility is allowed to change across the wage distribution, without
being rigidly defined by the specific copula imposed on the data. This model feature allows us
to assess whether a so-called ”low-wage trap” exists or not, i.e. whether the degree of wage
mobility is lower at the bottom end of the distribution than in the middle or at the top.
In the previous literature, many studies focused on inter-generational wage mobility (see, for
example, Behrman and Taubman (1985), Solon (1992), Bratsberg et al. (2007), Corak (2013),
Chetty et al. (2014)). However, at present, labor markets appear to be characterized by more
and more flexible and discontinous careers, so that the interest in the factors at the root of
intra-generational wage mobility seems to be justified. Indeed, there are only a few studies
on lifetime’s wage mobility in the US. Therefore, our aim is to obtain further insights on the
1We would like to thank Richard Blundell, Martin Browning, Robert Gary-Bobo, Christian Gourieroux, Bo
Honoré, Thierry Kamionka, Rico Maggi, Blaise Melly, Alain Monfort, Jean-Marc Robin, Sébastien Roux, Mirco
Rubin, Stefan Sperlich, Mark Watson, the participants to the Brown Bag seminar at USI Lugano on 9th December
2015, the participants to the Annual Conference of the Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics on 9th − 10th
June 2016 in Lugano and the participants to the junior seminar at CREST on 11th April 2017 for their insightful
comments.
2In this paper the terms earnings and wages are used interchangeably; earnings stand for labor earnings.
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wage dynamics in the US labor markets, controlling for both the individual’s past position in
the distribution and for her characteristics.
Our aim is to assess the impact of education and that of the past position in the distribution
on the current wage rank. Indeed, if we were to find empirical evidence that highly educated
individuals previously found at the bottom of the distribution, have a higher likelihood to ex-
perience upward positional mobility in the following year than their less-educated colleagues,
then the policy implication would be that encouraging higher education helps low-paid workers
to escape the low-wage trap. In general, the finding of a higher degree of mobility at the lower
end of the wage distribution would suggest that, in the US labor market in the period considered,
there is no such thing as a low wage trap.
Piketty and Saez (2003) as well as Gabaix et al. (2016) point out that income inequality in the
US started to rise again from the ‘60s after a period of decline in correspondence to WWII.
According to Autor et al. (2006), to Autor and Dorn (2013) and to Foote and Ryan (2015),
since the‘70s in the US wage inequality began to increase and, starting from the ‘80s, the US
labor market witnessed a growing polarization between low-paid and high-paid jobs. Moreover,
according to Goos et al. (2009), starting from the early ‘90s a similar polarization process
also took place extensively in the European countries. This suggests that, in the period that
we consider, a low-wage trap actually existed in the US, preventing workers in low-paid or
secondary jobs to access the high-paid (primary) positions. This is consistent with the theory of
dual or segmented labor market (Reich et al. (1973), Piore (1975), Dickens and Lang (1988)).
There are two main approaches to analyse earnings mobility (Dickens (2000), Jantti and Jenkins
(2013)). The first one considers the distance between different individuals in term of their wages
(absolute mobility), whereas the second one analyzes changes in the ranking of individuals
from one period to another (relative mobility). The focus of the present paper is on the latter
definition. More specifically, the present work is about micro-mobility, i.e. the investigation of
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which individuals experience larger changes in their wage ranks. In a companion paper (Naguib
and Maggi (2017)) we show that the impact of relative wage mobility on job satisfaction is far
larger than that of absolute wage mobility on the same variable. Moreover, we find that the
individual cares about her position in the entire wage distribution, not only about her position
in a restricted group of peers. These findings justify the approach followed in the present paper.
Our methodology allows us to model the present rank as a nonlinear function of both the past
rank and of an index which is constructed as a weighted sum of individual explanatory varia-
bles. In this way, it is possible to virtually analyze the transition from the past to the present
rank of each individual in the sample and to assess which are the characteristics associated with
a higher or a lower degree of positional mobility. Differently from what has been done by Bon-
homme and Robin (2009), dependence of positional mobility on the past rank is here explicitly
taken into account nonparametrically in the model, rather than being determined by the chosen
parametric copula function.
In a recent paper, Arellano and Bonhomme (2017) develop a novel quantile selection model,
with a method to correct for sample selection, and apply it to the estimation of wage percentiles
in the UK for the period 1978-2000. The focus of the authors is rather different from ours, since
they aim at estimating wage quantiles and their evolution over time, rather than at modelling the
individual dynamics of wage ranks. Further, Arellano et al. (2017) propose relevant advances
in the modellization of income processes. In particular, they study nonlinear persistence of the
earnings process. The focus of the authors lies in macro-persistence of income, i.e. evaluated at
different (aggregate) percentiles. Our focus, instead lies in the analysis of individual dynamics
of wage ranks.
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2.1.1 Literature review
Previous studies often found evidence of a lower degree of wage mobility at the extremes of the
distribution and in particular at the lowest decile, for example in the case of the US (Hungerford
(1993), Gottschalk (1997)). Indeed, Auten et al. (2013) find evidence of a rather high positional
persistence in the top 1% of taxpayers in the US. In principle, we expect upward wage mobi-
lity to be increasing in education and downward wage mobility to be decreasing in the same
variable. Aggregating these two countervailing effects, Gittleman and Joyce (1996) claim that
stability of earnings increases with education. Tansel et al. (2014), too, find a negative relati-
onship between the education level and the degree of mobility. This is mainly due to the fact
that high-educated individuals have substantially lower probabilities of experiencing downward
mobility. As for the US, Auten and Gee (2009) find evidence that the most important explana-
tory variables of wage mobility are age and the past position in the distribution. Hence, these
variables are included in our model. The authors find upward wage mobility to be decreasing
both in age and in the past position, i.e. upward mobility is higher for workers being at the
bottom percentiles in the previous period. In general, we expect positional mobility to be rather
high in the US, given that the country has been often defined as ”the land of opportunities” (Fer-
rie (2005)). Indeed, Schiller (1977) finds a relevant degree of relative earnings mobility among
employed males in the US. A consistent proportion of low-paid workers is found to be able to
move out from their past position and obtain better-paid jobs, thus providing evidence against
the existence of a so-called low-wage trap (Schiller (1977)).
Buchinsky and Hunt (1999) find that wage mobility contributes to lower wage inequality in the
US. More specifically, the authors find evidence that the highest probability of remaining in the
same quantile in the next period are recorded at the top of the distribution. However, the staying
probabilities at the bottom of the wage scale are also rather high. Burkhauser et al. (1997), too,
finds a large amount of rank persistence in the US labor market. To conclude, Kopczuk et al.
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(2010) show that the degree of earnings mobility in the US has been quite stable over the past
decades.
2.1.2 Methodological considerations
Many empirical studies tried to assess the degree of wage mobility within an economy by means
of transition matrices derived from a Markov chain. However, this approach rests on some un-
realistic assumptions. Transition matrices, in fact, result in loss of information at the individual
level, since they neglect income variations that take place within the same class. The model
also assumes individual homogeneity, which may lead to a significant underestimation of wage
mobility (Fields and Ok (1999), Fachinger and Himmelreicher (2012)). Moreover, partition of
income into quantile intervals is not operated on the basis of some economic criteria, but it is
simply determined by the empirical income distribution (Schulter (1997)). To consistently esti-
mate the transition probabilities, it is necessary to adequately take into account past individual
histories. Bonhomme and Robin (2009) apply a copula model to the ranks of the transitory
wage component. The joint distribution of the present and the past transitory component is mo-
deled by the authors via the one-parameter Plackett copula. The copula parameter represents
individual positional persistence and is a function of calendar time and individual explanatory
variables (experience, experience squared and five dummies, one for each education level). The
authors find a significant degree of wage immobility in the early ’90s in France. Relative mo-
bility appears to be decreasing in both experience and the level of education, a feature that is
likely to represent the decreased downward mobility risk for the older and high-educated wor-
kers. However, in Bonhomme and Robin (2009), the dependence of the mobility parameter on
the past rank is rigidly defined by the type of copula chosen by the authors. Our goal, instead,
consists in defining a model in which dependence of the mobility measure on the past position
derives from the data and not from the copula structure imposed over them. Indeed, as it emer-
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ges from the past literature, wage mobility may take an inverted U-shaped pattern, being low at
the extremes of the distribution and high in the middle of it (de Coulon and Zuercher (2001),
Cardoso (2004), Pavlopoulos et al. (2007), Germandt (2009). In particular, Cardoso (2004)
finds that mobility is lower in the bottom and the upper tails of the distribution, both in the UK
and in the US.
The aim of the present work is to estimate a copula model, in which mobility is a function of
both the past rank, and of some individual explanatory variables. To the best of our knowledge,
the analysis of a copula density with a functional parameter, the arguments of the copula being
the current value and the first-order lag of an underlying non-linear autoregressive process, has
never been performed in the past literature. A copula is a function that joins a multivariate
distribution function to its one-dimensional marginal distribution functions (Joe (1997), Nel-
sen (1999), see Appendix D in the Supplementary Material). As explained by Patton (2012),
copula-based models allow the researcher to specify the models for the marginal distributions
separately from the dependence structure that links these distributions to form a joint distribu-
tion. This feature of copulas allows for a large degree of flexibility in model specification and
estimation. Indeed, in the past literature the marginal distributions have been often estimated
by nonparametric methods (usually resorting to the empirical cumulative distribution function),
whereas the unknown parameter characterizing the copula model is estimated via a Maximum
Likelihood approach (Patton (2012)). Chen and Fan (2006) and Otto (2005) study the efficient
estimation of a model with fully parametric copula function and non-parametric marginal dis-
tributions. Chen et al. (2009) examine the asymptotic properties of a copula-based quantile
autoregressive model; however, their autoregressive model is fully parametric. Indeed, in the
conclusions the authors mention semi-parametric modelling of the copula itself via the method
of Sieves as a feasible strategy to expand the menu of the currently available parametric copula.
Such semi-parametric estimation will be performed in the present work. The focus of our paper
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is on a model in which the parameter of the Gaussian copula is replaced by a bivariate function
to be estimated by means of nonparametric methods. We use this copula with the present rank
and the arguments of the bivariate autoregressive function, i.e. the past rank and the weigh-
ted sum of individual characteristics, to model the dynamic of the ranks so that the marginal
law of the present rank remains standard normal. In this setting, the challenge arises from the
introduction of explanatory variables in the model.
Our approach is intermediate between the standard parametric specification, and the fully un-
restricted approach and builds on Gagliardini and Gourieroux (2007). The authors examine the
case in which the joint density is constrained and depends on a small number of one-dimensional
functional parameters. Such a constrained nonparametric approach has some advantages with
respect to both extremes presented above in order to model nonlinear dependence. First, by
using functional parameters instead of scalar ones, it is possible to achieve greater flexibility
and a better fit of the model to the data, compared to fully parametric specifications. Second,
as shown by Gagliardini and Gourieroux (2007), the rate of convergence of the appropriate
estimators for the functional parameters and for the joint density is equal to the standard one-
dimensional nonparametric rate, thus avoiding the curse of dimensionality of the fully nonpara-
metric approach.
The remaining of the present paper is structured as follows. As a descriptive analysis of the data,
Section 2 presents some kernel estimates of the relationship between the present and the past
ranks as well as preliminary unconstrained estimates. Section 3 introduces the full model used
to define the joint dynamics of the ranks. Section 4 is devoted to the description and comment
of the results of the constrained estimates and Section 5 concludes.
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2.2 Data and exploratory analysis
2.2.1 Data description
In this section we perform a descriptive analysis of the data, in order to get preliminary insights
on the shape of the relationship between present and past wage ranks. From the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics we collect an unbalanced sample that contains 35’378 observations (nT ) and
covers the period 1975-19963. Since our aim is to extend Bonhomme and Robin (2009) work
and hence to obtain comparable results, we follow the same procedure used by the authors in
order to construct our sample. More precisely, we drop observations for students, retirees and
self-employed workers and we only include observations relative to full-time male employees,
in order to limit the role of variations in the intensive margin of labor supply on wage dynamics
(Bonhomme and Robin (2009), Bachmann et al. (2014)). We consider individuals aged bet-
ween 15 and 64, since these are the usual thresholds for the definition of the active population.
Moreover, as usual in the wage mobility literature (Buchinsky and Hunt (1999)) we exclude
observations with wage equal to zero. This means that, for each couple of years considered,
we exclude from our sample observations of female and part-time workers, of those who are
beyond the age thresholds of the active population and of those who earn a zero wage. We are
aware that there may be differences in the functioning of the labor market in different states
of the US. However, due to feasibility constraints and in the wake of the previous literature
(Burkhauser et al. (1997), Buchinsky and Hunt (1999), Auten et al. (2013), Kim (2013)) we
will consider the US labor market as a whole.
Similarily to what has been done by Bonhomme and Robin (2009) we use as individual explana-
tory variables age, age squared, and five education dummies. We assume that these explanatory
variables are exogenous. The education dummies are constructed on the basis of the varia-
3The choice of the time span analyzed here is due to the features of the PSID data. Indeed, data on years
of education completed, our main explanatory variable of wage mobility, are only collected starting from 1975.
Moreover, the structure of the survey changed in 1997, becoming bi-annual instead of annual.
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ble ”years spent in education”, which is recorded in the PSID. According to the US education
system, the first dummy correponds to 1-8 years of education, thus including elementary and
middle school; the second dummy stands for junior high school (9-11 years), the third one re-
presents senior high school (12-15 years), the fourth is for college completion (16 years) and
the last one stands for graduate education (17 years of education or more).
Table 2 in Appendix A reports the descriptive statistics for our main variables of interests,
i.e. wage and education. Note that in Table 2 education is expressed by the number of year
of education completed by the individual. However, as it has been explained above, for the
estimation of our model we transform this variable, by replacing it with five education dummies,
one for each education level. Each education level corresponds to a certain number of years
spent in school, as explained above. We then divide our sample into 6 sub-samples, one for each
age cohort (from 17 to 24 years, from 25 to 32, from 33 to 40, from 41 to 48, from 49 to 56 and
from 57 to 64). Descriptive statistics by age cohort for our main variables of interest are reported
in Table 2 in Appendix A. These summary statistics about education and wages are almost
constant across different age groups; this suggest that our estimation results will not be biased
by a cohort effect. In Figure 15 (Appendix A), we also plot the empirical cumulative distribution
functions (cdf) of real annual wage (i.e. adjusted for inflation), in order to assess whether there
is a significant cohort effect. These empirical distribution functions are rather close to each
other (they almost fully overlap) and they are also close to the global cdf (i.e. that computed on
the real annual wage of all age groups). From Figure 13, reported in Appendix A, we notice that
the empirical cumulative distributions of real wages in 1976 and in 1996 almost overlap, once
we correct for inflation in both years considered. This suggests that the wage distribution in real
terms in the US did not witness dramatic changes in the period considered in our sample. In this
context of a rather stable real wage distribution, we want to assess which groups experienced
the highest degree of positional mobility and which ones, instead, had the lowest mobility. As
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usual in the education economics literature, we find evidence of a positive relationship between
wage and education. Indeed, if we regress log wage on the years of education completed, the
estimated coefficient is positive and and statistically significant (at 99% confidence level, result
not reported for brevity).
2.2.2 Exploratory estimates
In this Section, we start to specify some simple models of the relationship between the present
and the past rank, before studying some nonparametric model specification. First, we specify a
linear OLS model, then we perform a polynomial regression and finally we resort to an uncon-
strained nonparametric model for the rank dynamics. In our first OLS preliminary regression,
presented in equation (2.1), the dependent variable is gross annual wage. We define individual
annual wage as the sum of two components, a permanent one and a transitory one (Bonhomme
and Robin (2009)). We first regress log earnings on age and the ratio of experience to age
after 15 (the threshold for active population) in order to purify earnings from the permanent
component, and then we study the evolution over time of the transitory component alone. This
preliminary estimation is perfomed via the panel data fixed-effect technique, in order to adequa-
tely take into account the potential presence of unobserved heterogeneity across workers4. We
also include in this regression a time fixed-effect (λt) in order to take into account all the ma-
croeconomic shocks on wages, among them also the impact of inflation on wages. The model
reads:
4Experience is recorded in the PSID as the number of years that the individual worked full time. For the period
of interest (1975-1996) and with reference to our sample of full-time male workers, the empirical correlation
between age and experience is rather high (0.89). Hence, in order to take into account the effects of both age
and experience on log wages, we introduce the ratio of years of experience to years after 15, in order to solve
the problem of potential collinearity between our explanatory variables. There are many possible procedures to
disentangle the permanent and the transitory wage components, we chose here a rather simple one, which is already
established in the literature. A throughout analysis of the relationship between the permanent and the transitory
individual earnings component, indeed, lies beyond the scope of the present paper. For detailed information on a
more elaborate procedure to disentagle the permanent and the transitory earnings components, see Bonhomme and
Robin (2010).
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Wagei,t = β1Ageit + β2
Experienceit
Ageit − 15 + ηi + λt + i,t (2.1)
where Wagei.t stands for log earnings, ExperienceitAgeit−15 is the proportion of years of activity in labor
market to age in excess of 15, ηi represents the individual fixed effect and i,t the transitory
wage component5. From the residuals of this preliminary regression, we obtain the Gaussian
wage ranks via the following formula:
Zi,t = Φ
−1(Fˆt(ˆi,t)).
We compute earnings ranks using the empirical cdf of earnings residuals, Fˆt, and we apply
the quantile function of the standard normal distribution, Φ−1, to impose standard gaussianity
(Gottschalk (1982), Moffitt and Gottschalk (2002), Kalwij and Alessie (2007), Bonhomme and
Robin (2009)). We perform some unit-root tests on Zi,t, to ensure that these n variables are
stationary. The results of the Levin-Lin-Chu test, of the Harris-Tzavalis test and of the Breitung
test allow us to reject at a 99% confidence level the null hypothesis that some panels contain unit
roots (results reported in Table 3 of Appendix A). We assume for simplicity that the conditional
rank variance is constant across the wage distribution. A kernel estimation of the conditional
rank variance seems to confirm this hypothesis. This result is reported in Appendix A (Figure
17). Moreover, from Figure 14 in Appendix A we notice that the relationship between present
and past Gaussian ranks does not seem to be significantly influenced by the age cohort. We
introduce now a slightly more complex model, in which quadratic and cubic terms are also
present:
Zi,t = a0 + aZi,t−1 + bZ2i,t−1 + cZ
3
i,t−1 + ei,t (2.2)
5We tried different model specifications for this preliminary regressions, e.g. also including a quadratic term,
such as experience squared or age squared, among the explanatory variables. The results did not significantly
change across different model specifications.
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We choose to estimate a polynomial rank regression of third degree in order to allow for asym-
metry in the relationship between the present and the past ranks, given that such asymmetry
emerges from the data. From the polynomial regression reported in Table 1, we deduce that the
coefficient of the linear term in equation (2.2) is rather high (0.97), thus suggesting a substantial
degree of positional immobility from one year to the following one. The fit of this regression
is represented by the dashed line in Figure 1. The coefficients of the quadratic term and that of
the cubic past rank term are statistically significant at a 99% confidence level, thus providing
further support to the hypothesis of a nonlinear relationship between the present and the past
Gaussian ranks. The statistical significance of these coefficients is preserved when we run sepa-
rate polynomial regressions for each copule of years in the sample (results are not reported for
brevity). Indeed, this finding is consistent with Altonji et al. (2013) and Arellano et al. (2017),
who claim that linear approximation of earnings dynamics may not always be accurate.
Table 1: Third-degree polynomial regression
Full sample (1975-1996)
constant -.0454***
(.0030)
Zi,t−1 .9717***
(.0040)
Z2i,t−1 .0456***
(.0017)
Z3i,t−1 -.0290***
(.0011)
n. of obs. 35’346
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the third-degree polynomial regression in (2.3).
This regression has been run on pooled PSID data for the period 1975-1996.
As an additional exploratory data analysis, we run a kernel regression of Zi,t on Zi,t−1, in
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Figure 1: Gaussian ranks, full sample (1975-1995), nT=35’346
In this figure the results of three preliminary estimations are reported. The black line stands for
the fit of a linear regression of the present position on the past one; the dashed line represents
the fit of a polynomial regression of degree 3 in the past rank, where the dependent variable is
again the present rank. The bold dashed line stands for the result of a Gaussian kernel regression
of the present rank on the past one.
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order to get a first idea of the shape of the relationship between present and past ranks. The
fit of this kernel regression is represented by the bold dashed line in Figure 1. Both from the
kernel regression and the polynomial rank regression (Figure 1), we get some intuition that the
relationship between the present and the past Gaussian ranks is nonlinear in nature. In particular,
the slope of the function linking the present and the past ranks appears lower at the extremes of
the wage distribution. This finding suggests that the degree of wage mobility is higher both at
the bottom end and at the upper end of the distribution than in the middle of it.
In unreported results, we regress the cross-sectional correlation between the present and the
past ranks over the annual GDP growth rate6, in order to check for the stability over time of the
relationship between the present and the past rank, and we find the the estimated coefficient is
very small and not statistically significant. Hence, we deduce that the correlation between the
present and the past ranks exhibits no cyclical behavior. We also tried to regress our correlation
on the annual unemployment rate in the US7 and on the share of immigrants on the total popu-
lation8. In both cases, the estimated association between the two variables was not statistically
significant (results not reported for brevity). This convinced us not to include macroeconomic
factors among the explanatory variables that we deem at the origin of the rank dynamics9.
We now want to assess how the relationship between present and past ranks changes, depending
on individual explanatory variables such as age and education. We are interested in performing
a preliminary unconditional estimate of the model:
Zi,t = ρ(Zi,t−1,Wi,t) + εi,t (2.3)
where ρ(Zi,t−1,Wi,t) is the autoregressive function which represents the present individual posi-
6Data source: World Bank Indicators
7Data source: OECD
8Data source: OECD
9Note that, in all the three OLS regression described here, the dependent variable, i.e. the correlation between
the present and the past rank, which is always positive, has been transformed by means of the inverse logistic
function, y = log(ρ/(1− ρ)), so that it has an unbounded support.
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tion in the distribution as a function of his position in the previous period and of some individual
explanatory variables (here age, age squared and education)10. We define the variable Wi,t as
Wi,t = X
′
i,tβ; this variable is called a score, or index. It is the weighted sum of the individual
characteristics and allows to avoid the curse of dimensionality when numerous variables are
included in the model. This index is then standardized so that its distribution is (approximately)
standard normal. The details of the standardization are reported in Appendix B.
Single index models have been largely studied by the previous literature. Ichimura (1987) pro-
posed a semi-parametric estimator for a class of single index models. Powell et al. (1989)
solved the problem of estimating coefficients of index models via the estimation of the density-
weighted average derivative of a general regression function, without making restrictive as-
sumptions on the regression function or on the distribution of the data. Hardle et al. (1993)
tackled the problem of optimal smoothing in the context of single index models. Li and Racine
(2007) offer a summary of the most diffused methods for estimation and review the asymptotic
properties of these estimators.
In order for model (2.3) to be identified, some conditions must be satisfied (Li and Racine
(2007)). First, the vector of explanatory variables, Xit, cannot include a constant term and at
least one of the variables must be continuous. Moreover, the coefficients in the β vector have
to be normalized. Here, we adopt the common practice of setting the coefficient of one of the
variables (here: the dummy for the first education level) equal to one. The statistical significance
of this coefficient is confirmed by some preliminary OLS regressions that we run. The other
variables are age at the beginning of the period considered, age squared (multiplied by a factor
10−2, measured at the beginning of the sample period) and other four education dummies.
In model (2.3), we do not know neither the bivariate function ρ(·, ·)), nor the vector of coef-
ficients β in the index Wi,t, so we need to estimate them. We assume that the explanatory
10This unconstrained model does not take into account the marginally Gaussian law of Zit. A complete model,
which includes both the marginal and the joint laws of Zit and Wit is presented in Section 3.
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variables Xit included in the score are exogenous. This makes sense from an economic view-
point. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that the education level achieved before labor market
entry is not influenced by the rank assumed in the wage distribution once the individual actually
entered the job market. Hence, we exclude on-the-job training from our explanatory variables
due to the risk of potential endogeneity. We estimate the model by an iterative procedure, the
details are reported in Appendix B for brevity11.
In the remaining of the present section, we present some unconstrained estimation results obtai-
ned from model (2.3) on the US data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. From our
unconstrained estimate of the autoregressive function by means of a Hermite polynomial of de-
gree 2, we find that the score is always increasing in age and it is increasing in the education
level until college (Edu4it):
Wˆit = −0.0004Ageit + 0.0048Age2it + Edu1it + 1.0155Edu2it + 1.4691Edu3it
+1.6757Edu4it + 1.3786Edu5it.
Hence, people with a low value of the score may be young or low educated or both. The esti-
mated autoregressive function is given by the following expression:
ρ(Zi,t−1, Wˆi,t) = −0.0068 + 0.0263Wˆi,t + 0.8816Zi,t−1 + 0.0383Wˆi,tZi,t−1+
−0.0153(Wˆ 2i,t − 1) + 0.0417(Z2i,t−1 − 1)− 0.0164(Wˆ 2i,t − 1)Zi,t−1+
−0.0008(Z2i,t−1 − 1)Wˆi,t + 0.0003(Wˆ 2i,t − 1)(Z2i,t−1 − 1)
On the basis of the previous equation, we compute the partial derivative of the autoregressive
function with respect to the past position. This is our summary mobility measure; a high value
of this derivative means that the present rank moves close together with the past rank, therefore
11It is worth mentioning that, at each estimation step, the score is centered and standardized, so that it is approx-
imately standard normally distributed. More details on this are provided in Appendix B.
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there is a high degree of positional immobility in the labor market. On the other side, a low
value of this partial derivative would indicate that present and past rank are not closely asso-
ciated; therefore, the labor market would be characterized by a high degree of rank mobility.
Of course, this partial derivative is an incomplete and summary mobility measure. The full
information about rank dynamics lies in the bivariate autoregressive function ρ. However, our
summary mobility measure has the merit of allowing us to investigate mobility pattern in a more
readily interpretable and comparable way.
∂ρ(Zi,t−1, Wˆi,t)
∂Zi,t−1
= 0.8980 + 0.0383Wˆi,t + 0.0322Zi,t−1 − 0.0164Wˆ 2i,t
−0.0016Zi,t−1Wˆi,t + 0.0006Zi,t−1Wˆ 2i,t
(2.4)
Of course, given that we have approximated the autoregressive function ρ(·, ·) with a polynomial
basis of degree two, this partial derivative, for a given value ofWit, is necessarily a straight line.
As reported by Jantti and Jenkins (2013), many empirical studies as well as our descriptive
analysis of the data show that the relationship between the present and the past rank is positive,
i.e. individuals who are initially in the highest positions tend to end up in the upper part of
the distribution in the following period and vice versa. Consistently with this observation, we
find that the values of the partial derivative of the estimated autoregressive function are always
greater than zero, thus reflecting the existence of the above-mentioned positive relationship
between present and past rank. From Figures 2-4, we notice that the estimated autoregressive
function is increasing in the past rank, for any value of the score. This means that the highest
present ranks are associated with the highest past ranks, as it could be reasonably expected.
From Figure 2 we deduce that, almost regardless of the value of the score, individuals whose
past rank is from low to middle tend to improve their position from time t− 1 to time t. Indeed,
the autoregressive function lies above the 45 degree line in all the bottom and middle part of the
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wage distribution. This effect counterbalances the low-wage trap.
On the other hand, this autoregressive function is decreasing in the score for low values of the
past ranks and increasing in the score otherwise (see Figure 3 and 4). This suggests that the
effect of age and education level on the probability of improving or worsening one’s relative
position is heavily influenced by the past position in the distribution, i.e. the dynamics of the
Gaussian ranks exhibit a rather high degree of state dependence. From Figure 3 we notice that
the score seems to have only a slight influence on the shape of the autoregressive function.
However, the role of the score in determining variations in the shape of the autoregressive
function is somewhat larger at the top of the wage distribution.
However, age and education may have a countervailing effect on the shape of the autoregressive
function and hence, by aggregating these variables in a single index, it is difficult to disentangle
the effect of each of them. In the following, we compute the partial derivatives of this function
for different groups of individuals, in order to identify more precisely the effects of age and
those of education on wage mobility.
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Figure 2: Estimated unconstrained autoregressive function for different values of the score
In this figure we display the value of the estimated autoregressive function ρ(Zi,t−1,Wit), as a
function of past rank Zi,t−1,for different values of the score Wit, which correspond to quantile
25%, 50% and 75% of the score distribution.
31
Figure 3: Estimated unconstrained autoregressive function for different values of the initial rank
In this figure we display the value of the estimated autoregressive function ρ(Zi,t−1,Wit) as a
function of the score Wit, for different values of the past rank, which correspond to percentile
5%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 95%.
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Figure 4: Unconstrained estimate of the function ρ(Zi,t−1,Wi,t)
This figure shows the three-dimensional representation of the autoregressive function. This
function has been approximated with a Hermite basis of degree 2.
As mentioned above, in order to be able to draw more precise conclusions on the different
degrees of wage mobility for people of different ages and education levels, we resort to our
mobility measure, i.e. the partial derivative of the autoregressive function with respect to the
past position in the distribution. As it can be observed from Figure 5, for any education level
this partial derivative is increasing in the past rank for people in any age group (from 20 to 60).
Given that this partial derivative stands for positional persistence, i.e. immobility, this means
that the degree of mobility is lower at the top of the distribution than at the bottom of it for
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workers belonging to any age group in our sample. This constitutes a hint that in our sample
there is no low-wage trap, i.e. workers being at the bottom of the distribution exhibit lower
positional persistence than those at the top and hence should be able to improve their relative
position over time. In general, we find that the mobility pattern for people in their 20s and
for those in their 60s are rather close, people in their 60s being only slightly more mobile at
the bottom of the wage scale with respect to their 20-years-old colleagues. On the other hand,
middle-aged workers (in their 40s) appear less mobile than both their younger and their older
colleagues in all parts of the distribution. This suggest that they are more prone to the risk of
being stuck in a low-pay trap at the bottom of the wage distribution.
Note that for all the age groups and education levels, the degree of rank persistence is rather
high, with the value of the partial derivative of our autoregressive function ranging from around
0.7 to around 1. This reflect a rigid labor market, in which the current position in the wage dis-
tribution is largely determined by the past position of the individual and education only plays a
small role. Indeed, in general, we observe that there is no clear monotonically increasing or de-
creasing relationship between the highest education level achieved and the degree of positional
mobility. We find that the mobility patterns for people of the same age who completed different
education levels almost fully overlap. Hence, it seems that age and the past position in the rank
distribution play a far more important role than education in determining the degree of indivi-
dual positional persistence. We find that the upper ranks are generally characterized by a higher
level of positional immobility, i.e. once reached a high position, it is likely that the worker will
maintain it. To summarize, our unconstrained estimates provide indication that education does
not play a clear role in determining the degree of positional mobility. On the other side, we find
some indication that people who are in their 20s or in their 60s are more likely to escape the
low-wage trap than their middle-aged colleagues.
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Note that no constraint has been imposed on estimation. As a consequence, the model estimated
in this section (Equation (2.3)) does not necessarily respect the constraint that the present rank
must be marginally distributed as a standard normal: Zi,t ∼ N(0, 1). The aim of this section,
indeed, is just to get some preliminary insights on the relationship between the present and
the past rank. In the following section, instead, we will provide a complete framework for the
estimation of a constrained autoregressive function.
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Figure 5: Partial derivatives of the unconstrained autoregressive function w.r.t. past rank, for
different education levels
In each panel, we represent the pattern of the partial derivative ∂ρ
∂Zi,t−1
as a function of the past
rank Zi,t−1, for individuals in a given age class, across three different education levels. The
partial derivative ∂ρ
∂Zi,t−1
is a measure of positional immobility, i.e. larger values of this partial
derivative imply more positional persistence.
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2.3 The model
We are interested in the analysis of the dynamics of the joint process (Zi,t,Wi,t), where Zi,t
stands for the cross-sectional Gaussian individual rank in the wage distribution and Wi,t is the
(univariate) score, i.e. a weighted sum of the individual explanatory variables, Xit.
2.3.1 The general framework
In the following, N stands for the total number of individuals in the sample.
Assumption 1. The processes {(Zit,Wit), t ∈ N}, i = 1, ..., N are i.i.d. across individuals.
Let us define Zt = (Z1,t, ..., ZN,t). We want to specify a (semi-nonparametric) model for the
joint distribution of the Gaussian rank Zit and of the (standardized) score Wit. The sample
density is:
l(ZT ,WT ) =
N∏
i=1
l(Zi,T ,Wi,T ) =
N∏
i=1
T∏
t=1
l(Zi,t,Wi,t|Zi,t−1,Wi,t−1)
where Zi,t−1 = (Zi,t−1, Zi,t−2, Zi,t−3, ...) and ZT = (ZT , ZT−1, ZT−2, ...).
In the remaining of this section, we focus on modelling the conditional density l(Zi,t,Wi,t|Zi,t−1,Wi,t−1).
Let us now consider the following decomposition:
l(Zit,Wit|Zi,t−1,Wi,t−1) = l(Wit|Zi,t−1,Wi,t−1) · l(Zit|Zi,t−1,Wit) (2.5)
The distribution of the process (Wit, Zit) is thus characterized by the two conditional densities,
which are the transition density of the rank given the score history:
l(Zit|Wit, Zi,t−1)
and the transition density of the score given the past ranks:
l(Wit|Wi,t−1, Zi,t−1) (2.6)
We deploy the following assumptions on these conditional densities:
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Assumption 2. Process (Zit) does not Granger cause process (Wit), for any i.
Granger non-causality implies Sims non-causality (see e.g. Gourieroux and Monfort (1995)
Property 1.2).
Assumption 2 implies that the conditional density in Equation (2.6) is such that:
l(Wit|Wi,t−1, Zi,t−1) = l(Wit|Wi,t−1) (2.7)
Hence, under Assumption 2, the past ranks do not affect the score dynamics, i.e. the individual
explanatory variables included in the score are exogenous.
Assumption 3. Process (Wit) is Markovian of first-order with transition density l(Wit|Wi,t−1)
and is strictly stationary.
The first-order Markov property implies that Equation (2.7) can be further rewritten as:
l(Wit|Wi,t−1, Zi,t−1) = l(Wit|Wi,t−1). (2.8)
To ensure stationarity of the score, only strictly stationary explanatory variablesXit are included
in it.
Assumption 4. The rank dynamics is such that: l(Zit|Wit, Zi,t−1) = l(Zit|Wit,Wi,t−1, Zi,t−1).
This means that information about rank and explanatory variables occurring before time t − 1
is not relevant in determining the present rank Zit.
Moreover, from Equations (2.5), (2.8) and Assumption 4 we get:
l(Zit,Wit|Zi,t−1,Wi,t−1) = l(Wit|Wi,t−1) · l(Zit|Zi,t−1,Wit,Wi,t−1). (2.9)
As a consequence, (Wit, Zit) is first-order Markov. Equation (2.9) provides functional restricti-
ons on the specifications of the transition density in our model12. The two transition densities
12Note that we allow the conditional law of the present rank in Assumption 4 to depend also on the past value
of the score, Wi,t−1 and not only on its present value Wit. However, in the following we will assume that the
autoregressive function which links the present and the past rank only depends on the present value of the score,
Wit. Otherwise, the framework would become far too complicated in order to accommodate our copula model that
will be presented in the following Section.
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of interest are the following:
l(Zit|Zi,t−1,Wit,Wi,t−1) (2.10)
and
l(Wit|Wi,t−1).
The second of these two transition laws is exogenously given, hence we will exclusively focus
on the first one (equation (2.10)). These two laws define a stationary process for (Zit,Wit),
which will be characterized by a certain joint stationary law (implied by the model), whose
density we denote by l(Zit,Wit). In order for the model to be consistent with the interpretation
of Zit as a Gaussian rank, we need to ensure that the stationary density of Zit is standard normal:
Zit ∼ N(0, 1). (2.11)
In the following we prove that, under Assumptions 1-4 and additional constraints on transition
density (2.10), equation (2.11) holds.
2.3.2 A copula model
In this subsection we introduce a nonparametric specification for transition density (2.10) based
on a copula model. Given Assumption 1, for explanatory purpose, we omit the subscript i
in the following. Let c(·, ·, ρ) be a copula function that is indexed by the possibly functional
parameter ρ. Let us suppose that g(·; θ), θ ∈ Θ, is a parametric family of probability density
functions (pdf), and that G(·; θ), θ ∈ Θ is the corresponding family of cdf. Let l(Wt) be the
stationary distribution of Wt. We make parameter depend on variable W as a function θ(W )
such that:
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∫
g(Z; θ(W ))l(W )dW = φ(Z), (2.12)
where φ is the standard normal pdf. Let function c be a copula pdf, and define:
l(Zt|Zt−1,Wt,Wt−1) = g(Zt; θ(Wt))c[G(Zt; θ(Wt)), G(Zt−1; θ(Wt−1)); ρ(·,Wt)], (2.13)
where c(·; ·; ρ) is a generic copula density, where ρ(·,Wt) is the function indexing the copula.
This is a valid density function since it integrates to 1 w.r.t. argument Zt and
∫
c(u, v)du = 1.
To prove our main result for this Section we use the next instrumental lemma.
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1-4, if:
l(Zt−1|Wt−1) = g(Zt−1; θ(Wt−1)) (2.14)
then the following holds:
l(Zt|Wt) = g(Zt; θ(Wt))
Proof. We have:
l(Zt|Wt) =
∫ ∫
l(Zt|Zt−1,Wt−1,Wt)l(Zt−1,Wt−1|Wt)dZt−1dWt−1
=
∫ ∫
l(Zt|Zt−1,Wt−1,Wt)l(Zt−1|Wt−1,Wt)l(Wt−1|Wt)dZt−1dWt−1
Then, by Lemma 5 in Appendix E, the absence of Granger causality in Assumption 2 implies
that l(Zt−1|Wt,Wt−1) = l(Zt−1|Wt−1). Then:
l(Zt|Wt) =
∫ ∫
l(Zt|Zt−1,Wt−1,Wt)l(Zt−1|Wt−1)l(Wt−1|Wt)dZt−1dWt−1.
Now, by replacing the definition of the conditional density in (2.13), and in (2.14), we get:
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l(Zt|Wt) =
∫ ∫
g(Zt; θ(Wt))c[G(Zt; θ(Wt)), G(Zt−1; θ(Wt−1)); ρ(·,Wt)]·
g(Zt−1; θ(Wt−1)) · l(Wt−1|Wt)dZt−1dWt−1
(2.15)
We can further simplify the r.h.s. of (2.15) by using
∫
c(u, v)du = 1 ∀v. (2.16)
Hence, after a change of variable we obtain:
l((Zt|Wt) =
∫ ∫
g(Zt; θ(Wt))c[G(Zt; θ(Wt)), v]l(Wt−1|Wt)dvdWt−1
=
∫
g(Zt; θ(Wt))l(Wt−1|Wt)dWt−1
= g(Zt; θ(Wt))
This concludes the proof.
We come to the main result of this Section.
Proposition 1. Assume that the initial distribution is such that:
Z0|W0 ∼ g(·; θ(W0)) (2.17)
Then, under Assumptions 1-4:
l(Zt) = φ(Zt)
for all t.
Note that we do not specify the distribution of Wt, since we aim at deriving a result that holds
for any Wt. The only requirement that we impose here is that Wt is stationary.
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Proof. Let us write the marginal density of Zt as follows:
l(Zt) =
∫ ∫ ∫
l(Zt|Zt−1,Wt,Wt−1)l(Zt−1,Wt,Wt−1)dZt−1dWtdWt−1
=
∫ ∫ ∫
l(Zt|Zt−1,Wt,Wt−1)l(Zt−1|WtWt−1)l(Wt,Wt−1)dZt−1dWtdWt−1
=
∫ ∫ ∫
l(Zt|Zt−1,Wt,Wt−1)l(Zt−1|Wt−1)l(Wt,Wt−1)dZt−1dWtdWt−1,
where we use the absence of Granger causality in Assumption 2. We want to verify that the
following condition is satisfied:
l(Zt) =
∫ ∫ ∫
l(Zt|Zt−1,Wt,Wt−1)l(Wt,Wt−1)l(Zt−1|Wt−1)dZt−1dWtdWt−1
Now we insert our expression for the conditional density of the present rank from (2.13). By
(2.13) and recursive application of Lemma 1 we have l(Zt−1|Wt−1) = g(Zt−1; θ(Wt−1)) for
all t. Note that from equation (2.13), and l(Zt−1|Wt,Wt−1) = g(Zt−1; θ(Wt−1)) from Granger
non-causality and initial condition (2.17) and Lemma 1, the joint density of (Zt, Zt−1) given
(Wt,Wt−1) is
l(Zt, Zt−1|Wt,Wt−1) = g(Zt; θ(Wt))g(Zt−1; θ(Wt−1))·c[G(Zt; θ(Wt)), G(Zt−1; θ(Wt−1)); ρ(·,Wt)],
we deduce that c(·, ·, ρ(·,Wt)) is the copula of Zt, Zt−1 conditional on Wt,Wt−1.
Hence, we get:
l(Zt) =
∫ ∫ ∫
g(Zt; θ(Wt)) · c[G(Zt; θ(Wt)), G(Zt−1; θ(Wt−1)); ρ(·,Wt)]·
g(Zt−1; θ(Wt−1))l(Wt,Wt−1)dZt−1dWtdWt−1.
We now apply a change of variable:
G(Zt−1; θ(Wt−1)) = v
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and we get:
l(Zt) =
∫ ∫
g(Zt; θ(Wt))
(∫
c[G(Zt; θ(Wt)), v; ρ(·,Wt)]dv
)
l(Wt,Wt−1)dWtdWt−1
The expression in the round brackets in the formula above is equal to one for the copula property
reported in Equation (2.16), and thus:
l(Zt) =
∫
g(Zt; θ(Wt))
(∫
l(Wt,Wt−1)dWt−1
)
dWt =
∫
g(Zt; θ(Wt))l(Wt)dWt = φ(Zt)
By (2.12), which is exactly what we wanted to show.
Proposition 1 shows that, if the Gaussian rank process is initialized for a conditional distribu-
tion g(·|θ(W0)) satisfying property (2.12), and the transition density is as in (2.13), then the
condition of standard Gaussian marginal distribution for the rank process is met. We introduced
a model which is compatible with the condition of standard gaussianity of the ranks in a very
general framework; it applies to any copula family, possibly with a functional parameter. This
functional parameter, in turn, is allowed to depend on Wt.
2.3.3 The autoregressive family of copulas
In the previous section we have shown how to specify a joint dynamics of rank Zt and score
Wt, by means of a generic copula function that can be indexed by a functional parameter. In
this section we introduce a flexible nonparametric family of copula functions to be used in this
setting. These copula functions are inspired by nonlinear first-order autoregressive processes.
Let us consider the nonlinear autoregressive dynamics13:
Zt = Λ(ρ(Zt−1) + εt) (2.18)
13The model presented in this Section differs from that presented in Section 2. Indeed, here we specify a
constrained model, such that the stationary distribution of the ranks is standard normal. In Section 2, instead, we
just run a preliminary unconstrained model as a form of explorative data analysis, without making any assumption
on the laws of the ranks or of the score.
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where by hypothesis εt ∼ IIN(0, 1), Λ is a strictly monotonic function and ρ is a function
that expresses the dependence between the past and the present individual ranks, where Zt
is rank, the larger is the partial derivative of the function ρ(·) with respect to the past rank,
the higher the degree of positional persistence. Equation (2.18) defines a time-homogeneous
Markov process. We assume that ρ is such that Zt is a strictly stationary process with unique
invariant distribution. Let us now derive the constraints to impose on functions Λ and ρ such
that the invariant distribution of Markov process (Zt) is N(0, 1).
Proposition 2. In the process defined by equation (2.18), the invariant distribution of Zt is
standard normal if, and only if, the function Λ(·) is given by the following expression:
Λ(k) = Φ−1
[∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(k − ρ(Zt−1))φ(Zt−1)dZt−1
]
, (2.19)
for all k.
Proof. By the law of iterated expectations we have:
P (Zt ≤ z) = E[P (Zt ≤ z|Zt−1)]
= E [P{Λ(ρ(Zt−1) + εt) ≤ z|Zt−1}]
= E
[
P{εt ≤ Λ−1(z)− ρ(Zt−1)|Zt−1}
]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ[Λ−1(z)− ρ(Zt−1)]φ(Zt−1)dZt−1,
where Φ is the cdf of the standard normal distribution. Therefore, the following condition is
imposed: ∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(Λ−1(z)− ρ(Zt−1))φ(Zt−1)dZt−1 = Φ(z).
By applying now a change of variable: Λ−1(z) = k ⇔ z = Λ(k), we get the following
restriction, i.e. that Λ(k) is such that
Φ(Λ(k)) =
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(k − ρ(Zt−1))φ(Zt−1)dZt−1,
44
i.e. equation (2.19).
Thus, function Λ is a functional of function ρ. The integral in the RHS of Equation (2.19) has
to be computed numerically by simulation or quadrature. We get the conditional c.d.f. and pdf:
P (Zt ≤ z|Zt−1 = ζ) = Φ[Λ−1(z)− ρ(ζ)],
fZt|Zt−1(z|ζ) = φ[Λ−1(z)− ρ(ζ)] ·
1
λ(Λ−1(z))
,
where λ is the first-order derivative of the function Λ.
Therefore, we obtain the following joint pdf:
fZt,Zt−1(z, ζ) = fZt|Zt−1(z|ζ) · fZt−1(ζ) = φ[Λ−1(z)− ρ(ζ)] ·
1
λ(Λ−1(z))
· φ(ζ).
We can now get the explicit copula density of Zt and Zt−1. The copula pdf is:
c(u, v; ρ(·)) = fZt,Zt−1(Φ
−1(u),Φ−1(v))
fZt−1(Φ
−1(v)) · fZt(Φ−1(u))
=
φ[Λ−1(Φ−1(u))− ρ(Φ−1(v))]
φ(Φ−1(u))λ(Λ−1(Φ−1(u)))
, (2.20)
for the arguments u, v ∈ [0, 1]. This copula family is parametrized by the autoregressive
function ρ(·). Here, we combined the results from Section 3.2 and 3.3 to obtain our model.
The family of copulas represented by equation (2.20) is the one used in equation (2.13). We can
now make the functional parameter which indexes the copula depend on Wt.
Note that our results hold for any function ρ(·). Hence, we can easily introduce the score Wt:
ρ(·) = ρ(·,Wt) and c(u, v; ρ(·)) ≡ c(u, v, ρ(·,Wt)). Finally note that, in order to keep the no-
tation plain, we do not make explicit the dependence of Λ on ρ. However, this dependence is
immediate from Proposition 2. It is worth noting that the constrained model thus obtained is not
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a nested version of the unconstrained model presented in equation (2.3). In the constrained mo-
del, indeed, an additional transformation, Λ(·), is applied, in order to ensure that the stationary
distribution of the ranks is standard normal.
2.3.4 A functional mobility measure
The aim of this section is to introduce a measure of positional mobility. Summarizing the
previous section, the model specification is as follows. The distribution of Zit given Zi,t−1, Wit,
Wi,t−1 is:
l(Zit|Zi,t−1,Wit,Wi,t−1) = g(Zit; θ(Wit))c[G(Zit; θ(Wit)), G(Zi,t−1, θ(Wi,t−1)); ρ(·,Wit)]
where c(·, ·; ρ(·)) is the copula function defined in (2.20), g(·; θ(Wit)) is a p.d.f. that satisfies
the condition in equation (2.12). Let us define the variable:
ξit ≡ Φ−1[G(Zit; θ(Wit))] (2.21)
We write the stochastic representation of our model as follows:
ξit = Λ[ρ(ξi,t−1;Wit) + εit] (2.22)
where εit ∼ IIN(0, 1), and Λ(·) = Λ(·;Wit) is given by:
Λ(k;Wit) = Φ
−1
[∫ ∞
−∞
Φ[k − ρ(Z,Wit)]φ(Z)dZ
]
. (2.23)
We now want to derive an adequate measure of positional mobility. We start from the conditio-
nal expectation:
E(Zit|Zi,t−1,Wit,Wi,t−1) = E[G−1(Uit; θ(Wit))|Zi,t−1,Wit,Wi,t−1]
= E[G−1(Λ˜[ρ˜(Ui,t−1;Wit) + εit]|Zi,t−1,Wit,Wi,t−1]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
G−1
(
Λ˜[ρ˜(G(Zi,t−1; θ(Wi,t−1));Wit) + ε]
)
φ(ε)dε,
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where Zit = G−1(Uit; θ(Wit)) ⇐⇒ Uit = G(Zit; θ(Wit)), and this variable Uit follows
the stochastic representation Uit = Λ˜[ρ˜(Ui,t−1;Wit) + εit] from (2.22), where ρ˜(u;Wit) =
ρ(Φ−1(u),Wit) and Λ˜(k;Wit) =
∫ 1
0
Φ(k − ρ˜(v;Wit))dv.
So that we can compute the partial derivative with respect to the past rank, which stands for
positional mobility:
∂E(Zit|Zi,t−1,Wit,Wi,t−1)
∂Zi,t−1
=
∫ ∞
−∞
1
g
[
G−1
[
Λ˜[ρ˜(G(Zi,t−1; θ(Wi,t−1));Wit) + ε]
]] ·
Λ˜′[ρ˜(G(Zi,t−1; θ(Wi,t−1));Wit) + ε] · ρ˜′(G(Zi,t−1; θ(Wi,t−1));Wit) · g(Zi,t−1; θ(Wi,t−1)) · φ(ε)dε.
(2.24)
This measure corresponds to the partial derivative of the autoregressive function with respect
to the past rank (equation (2.4)) in the context of the unconstrained model presented in the
previous Section.
2.4 Estimation
We estimate the copula model of Section 2.3, in which mobility is represented by a function of
the past rank and of some explanatory variables. As explained in Section 2.3, the distribution of
the covariates has been modelled in order to ensure that present and past ranks are admissible
copula arguments. The model is estimated in a semi-nonparametric way, with the method of
Sieves (see e.g. Chen (2007) for a survey). The main idea of this method, which has been first
developed by Grenander (1981) and Geman and Hwang (1982), is to estimate a function by
means of the approximating space generated by a set of basis functions.
Similarly to what has been done for the unconstrained estimates presented in Section 2, we use
as explanatory variables age, age squared at the beginning of the sample period14 and a quali-
tative variable representing the highest education level achieved by the individual (Bonhomme
and Robin (2009)). We argue that these dummy variables are exogenous, i.e. that they are not
14This is necessary, since all the explanatory variables included in the score have to be stationary over time.
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influenced by the individual position in the wage distribution. Indeed, we only consider edu-
cation that takes place before labor market entry. We do not include among the explanatory
variables any form of on-the-job training, due to its potential endogeneity. This means that we
are in the particular case in which all of our explanatory variables are constant over time. For
the sake of generality, we maintain the focus on a general setting with regressors Xit dependent
on individual and time in the presentation of the estimation method.
2.4.1 Estimation strategy
Let us define Wit = X ′itβ
0
1 and:
l(Zi,t|Zi,t−1,Wi,t,Wi,t−1) = g(Zi,t;X ′i,tβ01) · c[G(Zi,t;X ′i,tβ01), G(Zi,t−1;X ′i,t−1β01), ρ(·, X ′i,tβ02)]
where G(Zi,t;X ′i,tβ
0
1) is the c.d.f. of the distribution of the rank, conditional on the individual
variables, g(Zi,t;X ′i,tβ
0
1) is the corresponding p.d.f., β
0
1 ∈ Rp1 and β02 ∈ Rp2 are parameter
vectors, and c[·, ·, ρ(·)] is the copula density in (2.20).
We need to estimate both the univariate distributions of the ranks and the joint one. Let us
first consider the estimation of the univariate conditional distribution G(Zi,t;X ′i,tβ
0
1). The use
of a linear combination X ′itβ
0
1 of the explanatory variables corresponds to a semiparametric
single-index model. We estimate the coefficient vector β01 with a kernel single-index Maximum
Likelihood approach:
βˆ1 = arg max
β1∈B1
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
kit log gˆ−(i,t)(Zi,t|β′1Xit; β1), (2.25)
where B1 ⊂ Rp1 is the parameter set, gˆ−(i,t)(z|w; β01) is the leave-one-out conditional kernel
density of Zit given Wit(β01) = w, where Wit(β
0
1) = X
′
itβ
0
1 and
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gˆ−(i,t)(z|w; β01) =
1
h
T∑
s=1,s 6=t
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
K
(
Zjt − z
h
)
K
(
Wjt(β
0
1)− w
h
)
T∑
s=1,s 6=t
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
K
(
Wjt(β
0
1)− w
h
) (2.26)
where K is a kernel density that satisfies Assumption 5 in Appendix C and h is the bandwidth
or smoothing parameter that satisfies Assumption 6 in Appendix C. Moreover, kit is the trim-
ming term introduced by Rosemarin (2012) 15. The maximization in (2.25) is performed by a
Newton-Raphson algorithm, starting from an initial guess for parameter β01 . This initial guess
has been obtained via an iterated maximum likelihood procedure, which is described in detail
in Appendix B. With this maximization, we obtain an estimator of β01 that is consistent for
N → ∞ and T fixed (see Section 2.4.2). By plugging in this estimate of β01 , we are now able
to compute the desired estimated cdfs:
G˜(Yit, fˆ) =
∫ Zit
−∞
fˆ(Z|Xit)dZ, (2.27)
where Yit = (Zit, X ′it)
′, fˆ(Z|X) = gˆ(Z|βˆ′1X) and:
gˆ(z|βˆ′1x) =
1
h
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
K
(
Zit − z
h
)
K
(
βˆ′1(Xit − x)
h
)
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
K
(
βˆ′1(Xit − x)
h
) . (2.28)
We now estimate the copula function, c(·, ·, ρ(·, X ′i,tβ02)). We perform a simultaneous M-
15This trimming term is defined as follows: kit = Iit ×
(
1
NT
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Iit
)−1
, where
Iit = 1 ifmin
 1h
T∑
s=1,s6=t
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
K
(
Zjt − z
h
)
K
(
Wjt(β
0
1)− w
h
)
,
T∑
s=1,s6=t
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
K
(
Wjt(β
0
1)− w
h
) >
a0n
−c and zero otherwise, for some small constants a0, c > 0. Thus, the indicator Iit is normalized to account for
the actual number of observations considered in the computation of the log-likelihood.
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estimation of the parameters β02 and of the autoregressive function, in the spirit of e.g. Wong
and Severini (1991) and Chen and Shen (1998). This estimation is performed via the following
Sieve Maximum Likelihood procedure:
θˆ = arg max
θ∈ΘN
N∑
i=1
l(Yi, θ, fˆ) (2.29)
where:
l(Yi, θ, f) ≡
T∑
t=1
log c[G˜(Yit, f), G˜(Yi,t−1, f); ρ(·|X ′itβ2)], (2.30)
Yi = (Zi,1, Xi,1, ..., Zi,T , Xi,T ), and G˜(Yit, f) =
∫ Zit
−∞ f(Z|Xit)dZ is the conditional c.d.f. of
Zit given X ′itβ
0
1 , and f is the parameter governing the univariate distribution, and fˆ(z|x) =
gˆ(z|βˆ′1x) is the estimator defined by equations (2.25), (2.27) and (2.28), θ = (β2, ρ(·|·)) ∈
B2 × H ≡ Θ, ΘN = B2 × HN where β2 ∈ B2 ⊂ Rp2 , is the parameter governing the copula.
Note that θ includes both a finite-dimensional and an infinite-dimensional component. H is an
infinite-dimensional space of bivariate functions and HN is a bivariate sieve space (made up
by Hermite polynomials in our implementation) whose dimension depends on sample size N .
More specifically, the approximation ρ ∈ HN is
ρ(Zi,t−1,Wit) =
m∑
k,l=0
λk,lHk(Wit)Hl(Zi,t−1) (2.31)
where λ is the vector of coefficients of the polynomial basis used to approximate ρ(·). The num-
ber of polynomials used to approximate the autoregressive function depends on the dimension
of the sample: m = m(N) (Chen (2007)).
2.4.2 Consistency of the estimators
We adopt the standard ”micro” panel asymptotics with T fixed and N going to infinity. As for
the convergence of our estimated univariate cdfs to the true ones, we suppose that Assumptions
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1-4 in Section 3.1 and 5-7 in Appendix C hold. By building on the results of Rosemarin (2012),
who extended the work by Delecroix et al. (2003) on semi-nonparametric estimation of index
models, the following theorem holds:
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1-7: (i) The estimator βˆ1 defined in equation (2.25) is consis-
tent:
βˆ1
p−−−→
N→∞
β01 .
(ii) The estimator gˆ defined in (2.28) satisfies:
sup
(z,x)∈S
|gˆ(z|βˆ′1x)− g(z|β0
′
1 x)| = Op
((
logN
Nh2
)1/2)
,
where S ⊂ Rp1+1 is a compact set introduced to control boundary effects.
(iii)
√
N(βˆ1 − β01) d−−−→
N→∞
N(0, V (β01)), where V (β
0
1) = Ω(β
0
1)
−Ψ(β01)Ω(β
0
1)
−, Ψ(β01) =
ESδ [∇β1 log g(Zit|β0′1 Xit)∇β1 log g(Zit|β0′1 Xit)′], Ω(β01)− is the generalized inverse of Ω(β01),
and Ω(β01) = ESδ [−∇2β1β1 log g(Zit|β0
′
1 Xit)].
Let us now consider the estimation of the copula parameter. We suppose that Assumptions 8-10,
which are reported in Appendix C, hold. In particular, we consider a norm || · ||Θ on parameter
set Θ which satisfies the requirements of Assumption 8. Hence, the following Theorem, which
directly follows from Theorem 2.1 in Hahn et al. (2016), is valid:
Theorem 2. If Assumptions 1-10 hold, then the second-step Sieve M-estimator θˆN defined in
(2.29) is consistent:
||θˆN − θ0||Θ p−−−→
N→∞
0.
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2.4.3 Empirical results
We apply the above estimation procedure to the sample of US data described in Section 2.
Analogously to what has been done for the unconstrained estimates, the polynomial basis used
to approximate the functional parameter ρ(·|·) in (2.31) is a Hermite basis of degree m = 2.
We also used another polynomial basis, e.g. Hermite polynomials of degree m = 3, and the
estimation results did not significantly change. In particular, the estimated coefficients of the
terms of order higher than 2 were very close to zero. For our implementation, the kernel K is
the standard Gaussian pdf. In the following, we focus on the estimated copula parameters, i.e.
vector β2 and function ρ(·|·). From the new estimated coefficients for the variable score, we
deduce that the latter is increasing in age and also increasing in the education level (with the
only exception of graduate school, Edu5it). This finding is completely consistent with what we
found in Section 2 by performing the unconstrained estimation procedure:
Wˆit = −0.0004Ageit + 0.0048Age2it + Edu1it + 1.0155Edu2it + 1.4691Edu3it
+1.6757Edu4it + 1.3786Edu5it.
The constrained estimate of the autoregressive function is the following16:
ρ(Zi,t−1, Wˆi,t) = 0.3441 + 0.1296Wˆi,t + 1.7348Zi,t−1 − 0.1548Wˆi,tZi,t−1+
−0.0496(Wˆi,t2 − 1)− 0.1211(Z2i,t−1 − 1) + 0.1076(Z2i,t−1 − 1)Wˆi,t
+0.0702(Wˆi,t
2 − 1)Zi,t−1 − 0.0345(Wˆi,t2 − 1)(Z2i,t−1 − 1)
(2.32)
In Figure 6, we display the autoregressive function (2.32). It appears that, for any value of
the score, this function is monotonically increasing in the past rank and it takes the highest
values for people with high levels of the score and high past ranks. On the other side, we
notice that the estimated autoregressive function is also (weakly) increasing in the score for
16Note that the score Wˆit is centered and standardized so that it is approximately distributed as a standard normal
variable.
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all the past ranks. The shape of the autoregressive function is similar to that found with the
unconstrained estimation procedure. However, with respect to the unconstrained estimates, we
notice that in the constrained case the score has a far larger role in determining the present rank,
in particular for low values of the past rank. Figures 7 and 8 show the sections of the constrained
autoregressive function, for constant score and constant past rank, respectively.
In Figure 7, the slope of the estimated function ρ(Zit,Wit) is in some cases greater than 1. Ho-
wever, it is more informative to consider the composed autoregressive function ρ◦Λ(U˜i,t−1,Wi,t),
whose sections are reported in Figure 9, which refers to the additive autoregressive representa-
tion of our model (see Section 2.3.4). From Figure 9, we see that the slope of this composed
function is always less than 117.
17The study of the stochastic properties of our model, included stationarity, is beyond the scope of the present
paper.
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Figure 6: Constrained estimate of the function ρ(Zi,t−1,Wi,t)
This figure shows the three-dimensional representation of the autoregressive function. This
function has been approximated with a Hermite basis of degree 2.
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Figure 7: Estimated constrained function ρ(Zit,Wit) for different values of the score
In this figure we display the value of the estimated function ρ(Zi,t−1,Wit), as a function of past
rank Zi,t−1,for different values of the score Wit, which correspond to quantile 25%, 50% and
75% of the score distribution.
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Figure 8: Estimated constrained function ρ(Zit,Wit) for different values of the initial rank
In this figure we display the value of the estimated function ρ(Zi,t−1,Wit) as a function of the
score Wit, for different values of the past rank, which correspond to percentile 25%, 50% and
75%.
56
Figure 9: Estimated constrained autoregressive function for different values of the score
In this figure we display the value of the estimated autoregressive function ρ ◦ Λ(U˜i,t−1,Wi,t),
for different values of the score Wit, which correspond to quantile 25%, 50% and 75% of the
score distribution.
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As explained before, the score is influenced by both individual age and the highest education
level achieved. We now want to analyze the estimated patterns of our mobility measure, as
defined by equation (3.10), which are represented in Figure 10. From Figure 10, we deduce
that positional mobility patterns do not seem to significantly change according to the highest
education level achieved by the individual. These findings suggest that, in the US labor market
for the period considered, experience or other individual factors play a more relevant role than
education in determining the degree of individual positional mobility. For each education level,
the mobility patterns of workers in their 40s and in their 60s almost fully overlap. We notice that
workers in their 60s are less mobile in the upper part of the distribution if they have completed
either senior high school or college. This hints at the fact that downward mobility for older
workers is likely to be reduced by higher levels of formal education achieved.
Note that, in Figure 10, the y-axis records the value of our mobility measure, as defined by
equation (3.10). The higher this quantity is, the higher is the association between the present
and the past rank and hence the lower the degree of positional mobility is. This is the reason
why the y-axis is labelled as ”immobility”. A remarkable difference with respect to what the
unconstrained estimation results suggested (Figure 5) consists in the fact that young workers
exhibit significantly higher mobility levels in the bottom and middle part of the distribution,
thus suggesting that they are not subject to the low-pay trap; this is true regardless of their
education level.
To summarize, we find almost no indication of the existence of a low-wage trap for any age
group of workers in the US labor market. Regardless of their education, indeed, people in their
20s and older show a rather high degree of mobility in the lowest half of the distribution. On
the contrary, they exhibit a high degree of positional persistence at the top of the distribution.
This finding suggests that they are not exposed to the risk of downward positional mobility.
For people in their 40s and in their 60s, too, mobility is generally decreasing with the past
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position. We found that positional mobility is not heavily influenced by the highest education
level completed by the individual. Also in Bonhomme and Robin (2009), indeed, the estimated
coefficients of the impact of the different education dummies on the mobility parameter were
rather close to each other. To conclude, Figure 11 shows our mobility measure in the case of
a fully parametric Plackett copula, the one used by Bonhomme and Robin (2009), which can
be compared to our constrained mobility measure. Both with our model and with a fully para-
metric copula, it emerges that positional mobility is higher in the middle of the distribution and
lower at the extremes of it, and in particular that there is a higher degree of immobility at the
top of the wage distribution. We notice that, by changing this unique copula parameter, the con-
cavity/convexity of this function is only slightly altered. Therefore, we conclude that a unique
parameter is not enough to control how mobility changes across the whole wage distribution.
Indeed, by comparing Figures 11 and 12, we deduce that our functional model allows for more
flexibility and, hence, for a more realistic and precise assessment of positional mobility in dif-
ferent parts of the wage distribution. We also perform the same computations with different
parametric copulas and the results are similar, i.e. by changing the unique copula parameter
it is not possible to precisely determine the mobility pattern in the different parts of the rank
distribution (see Figure 18 in Appendix A for another example).
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Figure 10: Mobility patterns for different education levels
In this figure, each panel represents the pattern of our mobility measure, as defined by equation
(3.10), for workers of the same age and different education level.
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Figure 11: Partial derivative of the Plackett copula for different values of the copula parameter
t
This figure shows how positional mobility, as it can be derived by the Plackett copula used by
Bonhomme and Robin (2009), changes across the distribution. The measure of mobility repre-
sented is: ∂
∂Zi,t−1
E(Zi,t|Zi,t−1,Wi,t,Wi,t−1) =
∫ 1
0
G−1(u; θ(Wit)) ∂c∂v (u,G(Zi,t−1; θ(Wi,t−1)) ·
g(Zi,t−1; θ(Wi,t−1))du, where c(u, v) is the Plackett copula.
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Figure 12: Autoregressive function ρ(·; ·) (upper panel) and the associated mobility measure
(bottom panel) for different configurations of the coefficients of the polynomial basis
The upper panel of this figure shows the pattern of the autoregressive function ρ(·; ·) for a fixed
value of the score Wit and different configurations of the coefficients of the polinomial basis
used for the approximation (Hermite polynomials of degree 2). The bottom panel shows the
pattern of the mobility measure defined by our equation (3.10) for each parameter configuration
represented in the upper panel. 62
2.5 Concluding remarks
As explained by Schumpeter (1955), the wage scale can be compared to a hotel, in which there
are both luxury rooms and cheaper rooms. At any point in time, all the rooms are occupied
by some guest; however, they do not always occupy the same room. The study of wage mobi-
lity aims at understanding how frequently do guests "switch rooms" and which are the factors
underlying this process. In this paper we presented a new model for the wage rank dynamics.
With a new autoregressive copula model, which allows greater flexibility than a fully parametric
one, we estimate the autoregressive function which links the present and the past Gaussian
ranks, conditional on some individual characteristics. We get evidence that, in the US labor
market, there is a rather high degree of wage mobility for both young and old individuals,
initially being at the bottom of the wage scale. We find no evidence of workers of any age or
education level being stuck in the so called low-wage trap.
A limitation of the present work is that we rely on the missing-at-random assumption for our
unbalanced panel data. Moreover, in the present paper we only considered age and the education
level achieved by the individual as explanatory variables; however, it would be interesting to
also control for other variables such as gender, or the presence of a migration background of the
worker. This constitutes scope for future research. As a future outlook, this constrained model
may be used to simulate individual wage trajectories. Another promising extension would be to
re-write the model in order to allow also for transitions into and out of unemployment.
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2.6 Appendix A Robustness checks
Figure 13: Evolution of the wage distribution in our sample, from 1976 to 1996
Note: real wages have been computed by dividing nominal wages by the value of the Consumer
Price Index in the United States in each of the two years considered.
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Figure 14: Relationship between the present and the past Gaussian ranks, for different age
cohorts, PSID data, 1975-1996
In this figure, each panel represents the association (linear fit) between the present and the past
Gaussian ranks, for each of the six age cohorts in which we divided our sample.
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Figure 15: Empirical cdf of real annual wage, by age cohort
Note: real wages have been computed by dividing nominal wages by the value of the Consumer
Price Index in the United States in each of the years included in the sample.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for education and log wage for pooled data and for age cohorts,
PSID data, 1975-1996
17-24 25-32 33-40 41-48 49-56 57-64 Pooled data
Education average 12.087 12.874 13.001 12.714 11.734 11.002 12.721
(years) st.deviation 1.607 2.176 2.485 3.033 3.543 3.907 2.681
min 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
max 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
median 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
25% quantile 12 12 12 12 10 9 12
75% quantile 12 14 16 16 14 14 15
Log wage average 9.384 9.823 10.131 10.204 10.068 9.978 10.076
st.deviation 0.578 0.600 0.622 0.703 0.691 0.756 0.629
min 2.996 0 0 0 0 0 0
max 13.665 12.724 13.176 12.995 13.181 13.459 12.969
median 9.393 9.852 10.167 10.258 10.086 10.021 10.094
25% quantile 9.210 9.582 9.852 9.888 9.741 9.649 9.680
75% quantile 9.826 10.258 10.597 10.714 10.592 10.485 10.477
This table reports some descriptive statistics for education and wage, for pooled data and divided
by age cohorts, in our PSID sample for the period 1975-1996.
Table 3: P-values of the unit-root tests for the Gaussian ranks Zt
H0: Panels contain unit roots
HA: Panels are stationary
Test p-value
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test 0.0000
Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test 0.0000
Breitung unit-root test 0.0013
The p-values reported in this table confirm that our rank processes are stationary.
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Figure 16: Correlation coefficient between the present individual Gaussian rank and the past
individual Gaussian rank at the specified lag
As expected, the correlation between present and past rank declines with time lags and it is
lower and lower as time passes.
77
Figure 17: Conditional rank variance, US data, nT=35’376
This figure shows the estimated conditional variance of the Gaussian ranks in the US, together
with the confidence interval for such variance. From this Figure, we deduce that it is reasonable
to assume that the rank variance is constant.
78
Figure 18: Partial derivative of the log copula for different values of the copula parameter a
This figure shows how positional mobility, as it can be derived by the log copula, changes across
the distribution. The measure of mobility represented is: ∂
∂Zi,t−1
E(Zi,t|Zi,t−1,Wi,t,Wi,t−1) =∫ 1
0
G−1(u; θ(Wit)) ∂c∂v (u,G(Zi,t−1; θ(Wi,t−1)) · g(Zi,t−1; θ(Wi,t−1))du, where c(u, v) is the log
copula.
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2.7 Appendix B Unconstrained estimation
As a first step, we obtain an initial guess for the β parameters in the variable score, Wi,t =
β′Xi,t, via a nonlinear least square estimation. The model is the following:
Zi,t = Ψ(Wi,t)Zi,t−1 + εi,t (2.33)
where:
Ψ(s) =
e2s − 1
e2s + 1
In Table 4, the results of this preliminary nonlinear least squares estimate (equation (2.33)) are
reported. We find that the variable score is increasing in age and decreasing in age squared.
Moreover, the score is increasing in all education levels, the highest values being associated
with senior elementary and middle school (Edu1) and graduate education (Edu5).
Table 4: Nonlinear Least Square estimate (NLS)
variable estimated coefficient
Age .0188***
(.0033)
Age squared·10−2 -.0173***
(.0060)
Edu1 1.3542***
(.0877)
Edu2 1.0431***
(.0485)
Edu3 .9255***
(.0415)
Edu4 1.1438***
(.0552)
Edu5 1.5022***
(.0892)
n. of obs. 35’346
This table reports the coefficients estimated via NLS on pooled PSID data for the period
1975-1996.
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We now perform a Sieve (unconstrained) estimation by using a Hermite basis of second degree,
Hj(X). Therefore, once we have got a first guess for β, say, βˆ, we construct the following
quantity: W˜i,t = βˆ′Xi,t. We then standardize this quantity and get the following:
Wˆi,t = (W˜i,t − average(W˜i,t))/st.dev(W˜i,t)
Now, we consider:
minθ
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
[Zi,t −
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
θjkHj(Zi,t−1)Hk(Wˆi,t)]2
from this minimization program, we get an estimate for θ, say θˆ, by Ordinary Least Squares:
θˆ = (H ′H)−1H ′Y
where H is the Sieve basis: H = [Hj(Zi,t)Hk(Wˆi,t)]. We can now perform the third step of the
estimation procedure:
minβ
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
[Zi,t −
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
θˆjkHj(Zi,t−1)Hk(β′X1,t)]2
Note that we are now minimizing with respect to β and not to θ. With this improved estimate
of β we are now able to repeat the subsequent estimation step. Note that, each time that we
obtain a different estimate of our beta parameters, we use this new result to estimate the (cross-
sectional) mean and the standard deviation of the score and then we use these estimates to
center and standardize the score itself again, so that it is approximately distributed as a standard
normal variable. We proceed in this way in an iterative fashion, until the estimation results are
substantially unchanged by another step of the procedure (we iterate until convergence). Note
that J = K = 3, since we use a basis of degree 2. This iterative procedure yields consistent
estimates of both the thetas and the betas. Indeed, in a time series context, Hautsch et al. (2014)
show that, when the number of parameters to be estimated is high, it is possible to divide the full
81
vector of parameters into some sub-vectors of arbitrary length, to be iteratively estimated in an
alternate manner by MLE. The only requisite for these procedure to yield consistent parameter
estimates is to start from a first guess which has been obtained by a consistent estimator. This
is indeed our case, since our first guess has been obtained by a consistent estimation technique,
namely NLS.
We stop our iterative procedure when the percentage change from the previous estimate to the
following one is less than 2% for each of the estimated coefficients. When we use a Hermite
series of degree 2 to approximate the correlation function, convergence is achieved after 26
iterations are performed. In order to ensure the robustness of the results found, we also tried
to do another iteration step after convergence was achieved, in order to compare the results
obtained with different optimization methods, such as a standard Newton-type algorithm, the
method developed by Nelder and Mead (1965), the quasi-Newton method developed in 1970 by
Broyden, and the conjugate gradients method based on the work by Fletcher and Reeves (1964).
In each of those cases, the difference between the estimated coefficient obtained with different
methods was less than 2% of the value of each coefficient. This findings confirms the validity
of the results found.
We also tried to estimate the thetas and the betas (i.e, respectively, the coefficients determining
the shape of the autoregressive function and those defining the influence of the individual ex-
planatory variables on the score) simultaneously, via a maximum likelihood procedure. In this
case, again, the difference in the estimation results between the two methods was equal at most
to 2.2% of the value of each coefficient and the difference in the estimated coefficients was
equal, on average, to 0.0016% of the value of the coefficient itself. This findings confirm the
validity of our results.
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2.8 Appendix C Consistency of the estimators
G.1. Assumptions
Assumption 5. (i) Function K(·) is a symmetric, compactly supported kernel in R and it is
three times differentiable with bounded derivative.
(ii) Further K(·) is either a second-order or a fourth-order kernel function, i.e. ∫ ujK(u)du =
0 forj = 1, ..., p− 1, and ∫ upK(u)du 6= 0, for either p = 2, or p = 4.
Assumption 6. (i) The bandwidth h = hN > 0 satisfies h = o(1) and n2−δh6 → ∞ for some
arbitrarily small δ > 0.
(ii) For the trimming operator we require that a0,c > 0 and nch2 = o(1) and n1−2c−δh2 → ∞
for some arbitrarily small δ > 0 .
(iii) h < n−0.5p and h4 > nδ−1, where p = 4 is the order of the kernel function.
Assumption 7. (i) For all β1 ∈ B1, (Zit, β′1Xit) has probability density gZ,β′1X(z, w) with
respect to Lebesgue measure on Sδ, this density is bounded, and such that inf
(z,w)∈Sδ
gZ,β′1X(z, w) >
0, where Sδ = {δ ∈ RP1 : ∃y ∈ R s.t.(y, δ) ∈ S}. Moreover, gZ,β′1X(z, w) and E(Xit|Zit =
z, β′1Xit = w) and E(XitX
′
it|Zit = z, β′1Xit = w) are (2 + p)-times continously differentiable
with respect to (z, w) ∈ Sδ.
(ii) For all β1 ∈ B1, letESδ be the conditional expectation given (Zit, Xit) ∈ Sδ,ESδ [log g(Zit|β′1Xit)]
is finite and has a unique global maximum β01 that lies in the interior of B1.
(iii) q′Ω(β01)q > 0 for any vector q ∈ Rp1 s.t. q ⊥ β01 , where Ω(β01) = ESδ [−∇2β1β1 log g(Zit|β0
′
1 Xit)]
and ∇2β1β1 denotes the matrix of second-order partial derivatives with respect to β1.
Assumption 8. (i)E[l˜(Y˜it, θ0, f0)] exists inR, where l˜(Y˜it, θ0, f0) = log c[G˜(Yit, f0), G˜(Yi,t−1, f0); ρ0(·|X ′itβ02)]
and Y˜it = (Yit, Yi,t−1).
(ii) For all  > 0, there exists some non-increasing positive sequence cN() such that, for all
N ≥ 1,
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E[l˜(Yit, θ0, f0)]− sup
{θ∈ΘN :||θ−θ0||Θ≥}
E[l˜(Yit, θ, f0)] ≥ cN() (2.34)
where lim infN cN() > 0, ∀ > 0, and || · ||Θ is a metric defined on Θ or some metric space
containing Θ.
Assumption 9. θ0 ∈ Θ, and ΘN ⊂ ΘN+1 ⊂ Θ for all N ≥ 1 and there exists some θN ∈ ΘN
such that:
|E[l(Yi, θN , f0)− l(Yi, θ0, f0)]| = O(η2,N)
where η2,N is some positive non-increasing sequence.
Assumption 10. (i) sup
θ∈ΘN ,f∈Nf,N
|µN [l(Yi, θ, f)]| = Op(η0,N) where η0,N is some finite positive
non-increasing sequence going to zero, µN [l(Yi, θ, f)] = 1N ×
N∑
i=1
{l(Yi, θ, f) − E[l(Yi, θ, f)]}
andNf,N = {f ∈ FN : ||f−f0||F ≤ δf,N}with δf,N = o(1), where ||f−f0||F = sup
(z,x)∈S
|f(z|x)−
f0(z|x)|.
(ii) There is a finite positive non-increasing sequence {η1,N} going to zero such that
sup
θ∈ΘN ,f∈Nf,N
|E[l(Yi, θ, f)− l(Yi, θ, f0)]| = O(η1,N). (2.35)
Delecroix et al. (2003) present the assumptions under which a semi-parametric single-index
model yields a consistent estimator in a cross-sectional framework. Their work has been exten-
ded by Rosemarin (2012). Assumptions 5-7 are needed to ensure consistency and asymptotic
normality of our semi-parametric single-index model in a panel data setting. These assumpti-
ons build on the conditions used in Rosemarin (2012). Assumption 5 imposes conditions on
the kernel function. Assumption 6 imposes conditions on the bandwidth h in order to obtain
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uniform convergence of the kernel density estimators. In particular, Assumption 6 (iii) is nee-
ded to show
√
N -convergence and asymptotic normality of the βˆ1. Note that Assumption 6
(iii) only holds if the kernel is of fourth order. Assumption 7 includes some requirements for
the continuity and differentiability of expectations and density functions. Assumption 7 (ii) is a
global identifiability condition for β01 andESδ [log g(Zit|β′1Xit)] is the limit value of the criterion
which is maximized in the sample. Matrix Ω in Assumption 7 (iii) is a sort of Hessian matrix
and Assumption 7 (iii) itself is a common requirement in the dimension reduction literature (see
Hall and Yao (2005)).
Assumptions 8-10 are adapted to our framework from Hahn et al. (2016) and are needed to
ensure consistency of the second-step Sieve Maximum Likelihood estimator. As underlined by
Hahn et al. (2016), Assumption 8 essentially requires that the second-step Sieve M estimation
problem is well-posed. Intuitively, our second-step estimation is a well-posed problem, since,
as it appears from equations (2.20) and (2.29)-(2.30), the estimation criterion does not only
depend on the approximating function ρ(·) via an integral of ρ(·), but also directly, i.e. via
the values of ρ at sample points. Verification of Assumption 8 from more primitive conditions
is not simple since the estimation problem is nonlinear. Assumption 9 is a condition on the
accuracy of the approximation of Θ by the sequence of Sieve spaces, it imposes a bound on
the approximation error and requires that the Sieve space is expanding. According to Hahn et
al. (2016), it is essentially condition b of Lemma A.2 in Chen and Pouzo (2012). Hahn et al.
(2016) also point out that Assumption 9 is implied by conditions 3.2 and 3.3 in Chen (2007).
Assumption 10 is similar to condition 3.5 of Theorem 3.1 in Chen (2007) and the first part of
Condition d of Lemma A.2 in Chen and Pouzo (2012); it requires uniform convergence of the
empirical process µN [l(Yi, θ, f)].
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G2. Proof of Theorem 1
Part (i)
To show consistency of the estimator βˆ1 in our single-index model, we apply Theorem 1 in
Rosemarin (2012). In our model, under Assumptions 1-7, the hypotheses of Rosemarin (2012)
hold. In particular, Assumption A1 in Rosemarin (2012), which requires the processes to be
strong mixing, is implied by our Assumption 1, i.e. that the processes (Zit, Xit) are iid across
individuals. Indeed, given that T is fixed, we can re-name the observations as follows, so
that our data are a particular case of time-series with finite-order dependence. To obtain this
result we rely on our Assumption 1. We have T observations for each of the N individuals
included in our sample. We re-arrange these observations in a unique vector, such that the first
T observations correspond to the first individual, the observations from T + 1 to 2T correspond
to the second individual, and so on, until the NT − th observation, corresponding to period T
for individual N . More specifically, observations are re-indexed as follows: Zj = Zi,t ⇔ j =
T (i− 1) + t, j = 1, ..., NT . And similarily for X .
In this way, by Assumption 1 we ensure that there is dependence at most for T lags in our
observations, hence we are in a particular case of strong mixing time series and hence the
Assumption A1 in Rosemarin (2012) applies to our case, with constants η1 = η2 = ∞. Note
that Assumption A1 in Rosemarin (2012) also requires data X to be strictly stationary. This
is implied by our Assumption 3. The fact of re-indexing the series does not invalidates the
result. Indeed, by our Assumptions 1 and 3, we can write l(Zj, Xj), j = 1, ..., NT , which
denotes the invariant density of processes (Zit, Xit). Having rewritten the model in this way, our
Assumption 6 (i) implies Assumption A3 in Rosemarin (2012). Similarly, our Assumption 5 (i)
implies Assumptions A2 in Rosemarin (2012). Our Assumption 6 (ii) implies Assumption A5
in Rosemarin (2012), and our Assumption 7 (ii) implies Assumption A6 in Rosemarin (2012).
Further, our Assumption 7 (i) implies Assumption A4 in Rosemarin (2012) because, by our
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Assumption 1 (iid individuals), the joint density can be written as the product of the marginal
densities and boundedness of this product follows from boundedness of the marginal densities.
Part (ii)
The second part of our Theorem 1 in Section 4.2 follows directly from Theorem 3 in Rosemarin
(2012). With respect to the previous part of our Theorem 1, here some additional assumpti-
ons are required. In particular, we also need Assumptions A7-A10 in Rosemarin (2012). Our
Assumption 5 (i) implies Assumption A7 in Rosemarin (2012). Assumption 6 (i) implies As-
sumption A8 in Rosemarin (2012). Assumption 7 (i) implies Assumption A9 and Assumption
7 (iii) implies Assumption A10 in Rosemarin (2012).
Part (iii)
To show
√
N -convergence and asymptotic normality of the βˆ1, we need again to assume that
our Assumptions 1-10 hold. The only additional requirement with respect to Parts (i) and (ii) is
given by Condition 2.8 in Rosemarin (2012), which is implied by our Assumption 6 (iii).
G3. Proof of Theorem 2
To show consistency of our second-step Sieve M-estimator, we apply Theorem 2.1 by Hahn et
al. (2016). In particular, Assumption 2.1 in Hahn et al. (2016) is verified if our Assumption
8 holds. Note that to get our Assumption 8 we re-wrote Assumption 2.1 in Hahn et al. (2016)
in a slightly different way to accommodate the panel structure of our data. Starting from their
expression (adapted to our case): E[Ψ(Yi, θ, f)] = E[l(Yi, θ, f)] = E[
∑T
t=1 l(Yit, θ, f)] =∑T
t=1E[l(Yit, θ, f)], then by our Assumptions 1 (iid individuals) and 3 (stationarity) we can
finally write E[Ψ(Yi, θ, f)] = T × E[l(Yit, θ, f)], independent of i and t. Then the fixed factor
T in the r.h.s. in equation (2.34) simplifies by redefinition of the constant cN(). Assumption
2.2 in Hahn et al. (2016) holds if we adopt our Assumption 9 and Assumption 2.3 in Hahn et
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al. (2016) is valid if our Assumption 10 holds. Note that Theorem 2.1 by Hahn et al. (2016)
requires that the first-step estimate fˆ is consistent in norm || · ||F, which is implied by our
Theorem 1 part (ii).
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Supplementary material
2.9 Appendix D Copula models
Joe (1997) and Nelsen (1999) provide extensive surveys on copula theory. A copula function
couples marginal distributions to get a joint distribution. By definition, a joint cumulative
function C on [0; 1]2 with uniform marginal distributions on [0, 1] is a copula. Thus, a function
C : [0; 1]2 → [0, 1] is a copula if the following conditions hold:
C(0, v) = C(u, 0) = 0, ∀u, v ∈ [0, 1]
C(1, v) = v, C(u, 1) = u,∀u, v ∈ [0, 1]
For any rectangle R = [u1, u2]× [v1, v2] ⊂ [0; 1]2 the following holds:∫ ∫
C(du, dv) = C(u2, v2)− C(u1, v2)− C(u2, v1) + C(u1, v1) ≥ 0.
When the distribution C is continuous, the associated density is called the copula density:
c(u, v) =
∂2C(u, v)
∂u∂v
, u, v ∈ [0, 1].
Sklar’s theorem (1959)
Let F (x, y) be the bivariate c.d.f. of random variables X and Y , with marginal c.d.f. equal to
Fx and Fy. Let then U = Fx(X) and V = Fy(Y ). The joint c.d.f. is given by:
P (U ≤ u, V ≤ v) = P (X ≤ F−1x (U), Y ≤ F−1y (V )) = F (F−1x (u), F−1y (v)), ∀u, v ∈ [0, 1]
Then there exists a copula such that:
C(u, v) = F (F−1x (u), F
−1
y (v)),∀u, v ∈ [0, 1]
89
i.e.F (x, y) = C[Fx(x), FY (y)] ∀x, y.
This copula is unique if F is a continuous distribution. Assuming sufficient regularity, it is
possible to obtain the following conditional c.d.f.:
P (U ≤ u | V = v) = ∂C(u, v)/∂v
The conditional density function is obtained by deriving once more with respect to u. The
copula is limited by the so-called Frechet-Hoeffding bounds; the upper bound is: CU(u, v) =
max(u+v−1; 0), while the lower bound is: CL(u, v) = min(u, v). In the case of independence
we have CI(u, v) = u · v. There are many different families of copulas, for example the
Gaussian, the Frank or the Gumbel.
The Gaussian copula
A Gaussian copula is associated with a bivariate Gaussian distribution with zero expected va-
lues, unitary variances and correlation equal to ρ. For 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, the Gaussian copula is defined
as:
C(u, v, ρ) = Φρ(Φ
−1(u),Φ−1(v), ρ)
where Φ is theN(0, 1) c.d.f., Φ−1 is the quantile function (the inverse of Φ) and Φρ is the
bivariate standard normal c.d.f. with correlation parameter equal to ρ. The Gaussian copula
density is defined as:
c(u, v, ρ) =
ϕ2(Φ
−1(u),Φ−1(v), ρ)
ϕ(Φ−1(u))ϕ(Φ−1(v))
Where Φ is the standard normal distribution, ϕ is its density and ϕ2(x, y, ρ) is the density of the
bivariate normal distribution with correlation coefficient ρ, expected values equal to zero and
unitary variances. More explicitly,
c(u, v, ρ) =
1√
1− ρ2 · exp
(
x2 + y22
2
+
2ρxy − x2 − y2
2(1− ρ2)
)
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with x = Φ−1(u) and y = Φ−1(v). It is known that CU for ρ = 1, CL for ρ = −1 and CI
forρ = 0 (Joe 1997 and Nelsen 1999). The lower bound, the minimum copula denoted by
CL, models perfect negative dependence, while the upper bound, the maximum copula denoted
by CU , models perfect positive dependence. The product copula CI stands for independence
between the two variables. The bivariate Gaussian copula generates zero tail dependence.
2.10 Appendix E Non-causality definitions
Definition 1.1 Granger non-causality (1969)
Let us consider two stochastic processes, (Zt) and (Wt). If the linear predictor of the current
value of W , given its own past and the past of Z, does not depend on the latter, then there is
absence of Granger causality from Z to W .
This definition, which has been originally formulated for the linear predictor case, can be ge-
neralized to density functions. Z is said not to cause W in the Granger sense if the following
holds:
l(Wt|Zt−1,Wt−1) = l(Wt|Wt−1) (2.36)
where Zt−1 = (Zt−1, Zt−2, ...) andWt−1 = (Wt−1,Wt−2, ...), and l(·) represents the conditional
density.
Definition 1.2 Sims non-causality (1972)
Let us consider two stochastic processes, (Zt) and (Wt). Z does not cause W in the Sims
definition if the linear predictor of Zt, based on ...,Wt−1,Wt,Wt+1, .... is identical to the linear
predictor of Zt based on Wt,Wt−1, .... alone. In this case, too, a generalization of the above-
presented definition is possible. We say that W does not Sims-cause Z if the following holds:
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l(Zt|Zt−1,WT ) = l(Zt|Zt−1,Wt) (2.37)
where WT = (W1, ....Wt, ....WT ) and Wt = (W1, ....Wt).
With reference to our model, we consider two stochastic processes, (Zt) and (Wt), where Zt
stands for the individual wage rank and Wt represents the score, i.e. the weighted sum of the
explanatory variables.
Lemma 2
If there is absence of Granger causality from Z to W , then the following holds:
l(W t+1|Zt,Wt) = l(W t+1|Wt)
Proof.
l(W t+1|Zt,Wt) = l(Wt+1,Wt+2, ...,WT |Zt,Wt)
= l(WT |Wt+1, ...,WT−1, Zt,Wt)l(Wt+1, ...,WT−1|Zt,Wt)
= l(WT |Zt,WT−1)l(Wt+1, ...,WT−1|Zt,Wt) (2.38)
The first term in the right hand side of equation (2.38) is equal to l(WT |WT−1) due to the
assumption of Granger non-causality. The same computations can be performed in turn for
every W in the interval [Wt+1, ....,WT−1]. Therefore, we have proved that:
l(W t+1|Zt,Wt) = l(W t+1|Wt)
Lemma 3
Granger non-causality implies Sims non-causality (in the sense of equations (2.36) and (2.37)).
It is known that the converse can be proved similarly (Gourieroux and Monfort (1995)); the
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two concepts are equivalent. For completeness, we present here a proof of Lemma 3, which is
similar to that presented in Gourieroux and Monfort (1995).
Proof. We assume that Zt does not cause Wt in the definition of Granger and we want to show
that this implies that Zt does not cause Wt in the Sims sense. Let us consider the conditional
density of Zt given its own past history, Zt−1 and the whole history of W , denoted by WT . The
following decomposition is always valid:
l(Zt|Zt−1,WT ) =
l(Zt,WT )
l(Zt−1,WT )
=
l(Zt,Wt)l(W t+1|Zt,Wt)
l(Zt−1,Wt)l(W t+1|Zt−1,Wt)
, (2.39)
where W t+1 = (Wt+1, ...,WT ). We need now to introduce the following Lemma:
Using Lemma 3, equation (2.39) becomes:
l(Zt|Zt−1,WT ) =
l(Zt,Wt)l(W t+1|Wt)
l(Zt−1,Wt)l(W t+1|Wt)
=
l(Zt,Wt)
l(Zt−1,Wt)
= l(Zt|Zt−1,Wt) (2.40)
We have shown that:
l(Zt | Zt−1,WT ) = l(Zt | Zt−1,W t)
i.e. that Z does not cause W in the Sims sense. Therefore, Granger non-causality implies Sims
non-causality.
Lemma 4
If (Zt) is a first-order markovian process conditional on (Wt) and if there is absence of Sims-
causality from Z to W , then the following holds:
l(Zt|Zt−1,Wt) = l(Zt|Zt−1,Wt)
Proof. From the assumption of Sims non-causality from Z to W we can write the following:
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l(Zt | Zt−1,Wt) = l(Zt | Zt−1,WT )
From the assumption of first-order markovianity of Zt conditional on Wt we know that:
l(Zt|Zt−1,WT ) = l(Zt|Zt−1,WT )
This last conditional density can be rewritten as it follows:
l(Zt|Zt−1,WT ) =
l(Zt, Zt−1,WT )
l(Zt−1,WT )
=
l(Zt, Zt−1,Wt)l(W t+1|Zt, Zt−1,Wt)
l(Zt−1,Wt)l(W t+1|Zt−1,Wt)
.
From Lemma 3 we know that Sims non-causality implies Granger non-causality (the two con-
cepts are equivalent). Therefore, from the assumption of Granger non-causality from Z to W
and Lemma 2 we obtain:
l(Zt|Zt−1,WT ) =
l(Zt, Zt−1,Wt)l(W t+1|Wt)
l(Zt−1,Wt)l(W t+1|Wt)
=
l(Zt, Zt−1,Wt)
l(Zt−1,Wt)
= l(Zt|Zt−1,Wt)
We have shown that:
l(Zt|Zt−1,Wt) = l(Zt|Zt−1,WT ) = l(Zt|Zt−1,Wt)
Lemma 5
If there is absence of Granger causality from Z to W , then the following holds:
Zt|Wt−p, ...,Wt+q ∼ Zt|Wt−p, ...,Wt
Proof.
l(Zt|Wt−p, ...,Wt+q) = l(Zt,Wt−p, ...,Wt+q)
l(Wt−p, ...,Wt+q)
=
l(Wt+1, ...,Wt+q|Zt,Wt, ...Wt−p)l(Zt,Wt, ...Wt−p)
l(Wt+1, ...,Wt+q|,Wt, ...Wt−p)l(Wt, ...,Wt−p)
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from the assumption of Granger non-causality and Lemma 2, we obtain the following result:
l(Zt|Wt−p, ...,Wt+q) = l(Zt,Wt, ...Wt−p)
l(Wt, ...,Wt−p)
= l(Zt|Wt, ...Wt−p)
This proofs that:
Zt | WT ∼ Zt | Wt
Lemma 6
If there is absence of Granger causality from Z to W , then:
Zt−1|Wt−1,Wt ∼ Zt−1|Wt−1
Proof.
l(Zt−1|Wt−1,Wt) = l(Zt−1,Wt−1,Wt)
l(Wt−1,Wt)
=
l(Wt|Wt−1, Zt−1)l(Zt−1,Wt−1)
l(Wt|Wt−1)l(Wt−1)
where l(Wt|Wt−1, Zt−1) = l(Wt|Wt−1)
from the assumption of Granger non-causality. Therefore we get:
l(Zt−1|Wt−1,Wt) = l(Zt−1,Wt−1)
l(Wt−1)
= l(Zt−1|Wt−1)
2.11 Appendix F Examples of simple autoregressive models
1.
This example is based on the assumption of joint normality of the ranks and of the univariate
score Wt: (Zit,Wit) ∼ N(0, Id). Let us consider the following laws for the dynamics of the
ranks and for the evolution of the explanatory variables:
Zt = ρZt−1 +Wt + εt
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and
Wt = rWt−1 + ηt
Note that in this example Zt is univariate. We then make the following assumptions:
1. εt ∼ IIN(0, ω2)
2. ηt ∼ IIN(0, σ2)
3. εt ⊥ ηt
From Assumption 1, it follows that:
Zt|W t, Zt−1 ∼ N(ρZt−1 +Wt, ω2)
and, from Assumption 2:
Wt|Wt−1, Zt−1 ∼ N(rWt−1, σ2)
The two conditional laws that characterize the joint process of the ranks and the explanatory
variables are normal. Let us now examine more closely the distribution of the present rank Zt,
which is recursively defined as:
Zt =
1
1− ρL(Wt + εt) = εt + ρεt−1 + ρ
2εt−2 + ...+Wt + ρWt−1 + ρ2Wt−2 + ...
where L stands for the lag operator.
The distribution of Zt|Wt, which for the hypotheses made in the previous Section is equal to
the distribution of Zt|WT , is the following:
Zt|Wt ∼ N(Wt + ρWt−1 + ρ2Wt−2 + ..., ω
2
1− ρ2 )
We can now compute the variance of Zt as it follows:
V (Zt) = V (E(Zt|Wt)) + E(V (Zt|Wt))
We get that the following condition must hold:
V (Zt) = V (Wt + ρWt−1 + ρ2Wt−2 + ...) +
ω2
1− ρ2 = 1
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which is equivalent to:
(1− ρ2)V (Wt + ρWt−1 + ρ2Wt−2 + ...) + ω2 + ρ2 = 1 (2.41)
With this example, we have shown that, under the hypothesis of joint normality of the ranks
and the score (weighted sum of explanatory variables), Zt and Zt−1 conditional on Wt have
Gaussian copula with correlation ρ. We assumed that Wt is normally distributed and that Zt,
conditional on Wt, is also normally distributed. In this setting, we were able to show that Zt
is also distributed as a standard normal. Furthermore, the present rank Zt has for sure zero
expected value (this result can be shown by a recursive procedure). In order for Zt to be an
acceptable copula argument, Equation (2.41) must hold. In this example we preserved standard
gaussianity of the present rank Zt, but at the cost of assuming a normal distribution for the score
Wt.
2.
In order to understand the characteristics that the non-linear autoregressive function should
have, let us consider the following example, where z represents the past rank and w stands for
the score:
ρ(z, w) = ρ0(z + α)
−w
Where ρ0 and α are constants, with ρ0 > 0 and 0 ≤ α < 1. We consider the partial derivative
∂ρ
∂z
(z, w) as the relevant measure of local positional persistence, which is function of both z and
w.
We have:
∂ρ
∂z
= −wρ0(z + α)−(w+1)
Now we can compute the mixed derivative:
∂2ρ
∂z∂w
= ρ0(z + α)
−(w+1) · [wlog(z + α)− 1]
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the first element is surely non-negative, while for the second factor there exists a turning point:
wlog(z + α)− 1 ≥ 0⇔ z ≥ e1/w − α
If the past wage rank is higher than a certain threshold (which inversely depends on the score),
then the mixed derivative is positive. This means that, if the past rank is high enough, a higher
score is associated with a higher degree of positional persistence, given that there is little room
for further improvements in the relative position.
When w goes to infinity, the turning point is very close to 1−α, while when w goes to zero, the
turning point is close to infinity (there is no turning point in the sign of the derivative). On the
other side, if we look more closely at the role of the score, we get that an alternative condition
for the mixed derivative to be positive:
w ≥ 1
log(z + α)
If the value of the score is greater than a certain threshold level (which inversely depends on the
past rank), then a higher initial rank is associated with a higher degree of positional persistence;
this means that a high score protects individuals at the top of the distribution from downward
mobility and, on the contrary, enhances upward mobility for workers at the bottom of the wage
scale.
2.12 Appendix G An example of function g(Zt; θ(Wt))
Let us suppose the following:
Wt ∼ N(0,Σ)
for the conditional density of the present rank we assume the following simple form:
Zt|Wt ∼ N(Wt, ω2)
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Zt is for sure Gaussian. However, in order for Zt to be an acceptable copula argument, we also
have to ensure that it has zero expected value and unitary variance:
E(Zt) = E(E(Zt|Wt)) = E(Wt) = 0,
by the law of iterated expectations. For the variance we have:
V (Zt) = V (E(Zt|Wt)) + E(V (Zt|Wt)) = V (Wt) + E(ω2) = Σ + ω2
Hence, the condition for unitary variance is:
Σ + ω2 = 1
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3 Wage mobility before and after the financial crisis: an em-
pirical analysis for Germany and the UK
3.1 Introduction
18 The aim of this paper is to analyze and compare the degree of relative wage mobility before
and after the latest financial crisis (2007-2009) in Germany and in the United Kingdom. Due to
the long-lasting effects of this crisis on the economic structure of many industrialized countries,
several scholars call it the ”Great Recession” (e.g. Caliendo and Hogenacker 2012, Rinne and
Zimmermann 2012, Blanchard et al. 2014). It is likely that, besides its effects on employment
and wage levels, the financial turmoil also influenced relative wage moblity. Earnings mobility
is a distinctive feature of an economy (Friedman 1962, Shorrocks 1978, Gregg et al. 2015),
which gives more insights than point-in-time inequality measures. The study of wage dynamics
allows to assess whether a ”low-wage trap” (Dickens 2000) exists or not, i.e. whether low-
paid workers have the opportunity of improving their rank over time. The contributions of this
paper are manifold. First, it is the first study devoted to the analysis of how wage mobility
changed after the recent financial crisis. Second, it tackles the issue of measuring differences in
wage mobility between immigrants and natives by means of a new semi-nonparametric method,
which allows to accommodate for complex wage dynamics. In the previous literature, indeed,
evidence on differences in wage mobility due to nationality is scarce and the few existing studies
only performed mean estimations with fully parametric models. Up to now, there is a large body
of literature on the effect of migration on employment probabilities and wage level of natives
(see e.g. Card 2001, Borjas 2003, Aydemir and Borjas 2011, Glitz 2012, Peri 2012, Smith 2012,
Cadena 2013, Patel and Vella 2013, Abramitzky et al. 2014, Olney 2015, Peri 2016, Dustmann
18I would like to thank Patrick Gagliardini, Christian Gourieroux, Bo Honore, Thierry Kamionka, Rico Maggi,
Alain Monfort, Jean-Marc Robin, Sebastien Roux, Mark Watson, the participants to the IRE seminar at USI,
Lugano, 13-14 October 2016 and the participants to the junior seminar at CREST, Paris, on 11th April 2017, for
their insightful advice.
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et al. 2016, Dustmann et al. 2017). However, there is still room for investigation on whether
immigrant workers have a higher or lower degree of wage mobility than their native colleagues.
Lastly, in the present paper we analyze the influence of different institutional frameworks on
the degree of relative wage mobility with the flexible model mentioned above. To the best of
our knowledge, the few existing cross-country studies on wage mobility only rely on summary
mobility indices, without analyzing the degree of (micro) wage mobility in different parts of
the earnings distribution (see e.g. Ayala and Sastre 2007). From a policy viewpoint, we are
mostly interested in the evolution of wage mobility at the bottom of the distribution; hence, a
flexible enough modellization of wage dynamics is fundamental, since we cannot assume that
the degree of positional persistence is the same across the whole wage distribution.
3.1.1 Literature review
The institutional framework in Germany and in the UK
In the literature, a distinction is usually made between three main models of labor market in-
stitutions (Blanchard et al. 2014). The first one, called ”Anglo-Saxon”, is based on a low
level of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) and a low unemployment insurance. The
UK belongs to this first case. The second model, called ”Nordic” or ”Scandinavian” (the flex-
icurity model) is based on a medium-to-high degree of EPL, a generous but rigidly-defined
unemployment insurance and strong active labor market policies. Lastly, there is the so-called
”Continental” model, based on high EPL, generous unemployment insurance and limited active
labor market policies. EPL includes laws about hiring and firing and on the use of fixed-term
contracts. Germany is the typical ”Continental” European welfare state: in 2013 Germany had
the most stringent restriction for the layoff of permanent workers, whereas the United Kingdom
had the least stringent regulations in Europe (Holmlund 2014). The level of employment pro-
tection is significantly higher in Germany than in the UK (Bruecker et al. 2014). The UK is
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also characterized by low unemployment benefits. A legal minimum wage exists in the UK as
well as in Germany. However, minimum wage has been introduced in Germany only in 2015,
whereas it exists since 1999 in the UK (Metcalf 1999).
In Table 5 we summarize the main features of the labor markets in the two countries under
scrutiny. As mentioned before, Germany has a stricter Employment Protection Legislation19
and a higher tax wedge. However, minimum wage expressed as a percentage of the median
full-time wage is now almost identical in the two countries. Data on unemployment rate and on
labor force participation are also quite similar across the two countries. Incidence of temporary
employment is higher in Germany than in the UK, both before and after the crisis; this finding
has often been mentioned by the scholars as one of the reasons why Germany was able to suffer
a relatively limited job loss during the Great Recession. Note that, of course, the economic
variables reported in Table 5 are subject to oscillations linked to the business cycle. Hence,
variations from 2006 to 2013 do not necessarily reflect a change in the underlying economic
structure caused by the crisis.
19This is an aggregate index ranging from 1 to 3.5 and including different aspects of EPL.
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Table 5: Overview of labor market institutions in 2006 and in 2015
Before the crisis
Germany United Kingdom
Employment Protection Legislation index (2006) 2.68 1.26
Public unemployment speding (as % of GDP) 1.6 0.2
Minimum wage (% of median full-time wage) - 45
Tax wedge (as % of labor cost) 52.3 34
Trade union density (2006) 20.7 28.2
Unemployment rate 10.3 5.3
Labor force participation rate 75 76.8
Incidence of temporary employment (%) 14.5 5.8
Share of part-time workers on the working population (%) 21.8 23.1
After the crisis
Germany United Kingdom
Employment Protection Legislation index (2013) 2.68 1.10
Public unemployment speding (as % of GDP) 1 0.3
Minimum wage (% of median full-time wage) 48 49
Tax wedge (as % of labor cost) 49.44 30.82
Trade union density (2013) 18.1 25.8
Unemployment rate 4.4 5.1
Labor force participation rate 77.6 77.6
Incidence of temporary employment (%) 13.1 6.2
Share of part-time workers on the working population (%) 22.4 24
This table provides a summary of the main indicators of labor market institutions and
labor market performance in Germany and in the United Kingdom before and after the Great
Recession (in 2006 and 2015 or latest available year). The source of the data is the OECD
Employment outlook 2007 and 2016.
It is worth noting that the degree of strictness of EPL did not dramatically change in any of the
two countries considered between 2006 and 2015. On the other hand, in 2015 both labor force
participation and unemployment had recovered and bounced back to their pre-crisis levels in
both countries (in the UK the unemployment rate was almost identical in 2006 and in 2015, yet
it was slightly lower in 2015 than in 2006). However, in 2015 in the UK both the incidence of
temporary employment and that of part-time work is higher than it was in 2006. In Germany, the
incidence of temporary employment is lower in 2015 than it was in 2006. The Gini coefficient
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computed on wages is equal to 0.3 in the UK, whereas it equals 0.29 in Germany (OECD 2015).
Eichhorst et al. (2010) find evidence that countries with a higher degree of labor maket flexi-
bility fared better in terms of employment during and after the financial crisis. However, they
suggest that such good results may have been obtained at the cost of a higher degree of po-
larization of the labor market, i.e. a stronger divide between well-paid and low-pais jobs. In
this paper, we are interested in assessing what happened to the degree of individual positional
mobility between 2002 and 2014.
Wage mobility in Germany and in the UK
In the previous literature, only a few studies tried to perform a cross-country comparison of
wage mobility (exceptions are, for example, Gottschalk and Spolaore 2002 or Chen 2009). Mo-
reover, those papers exclusively focus on the computation of some summary measures of wage
inequality and wage mobility, without allowing the degree of wage mobility to change across
the distribution. Atkinson et al. (1992 and 1998) evidenced the existence of national-level diffe-
rences in earnings mobility patterns. At a first glance, one may argue that the lower the degree of
Government intervention in the labor market, the higher the degree of wage mobility. However,
Salverda et al. (2001) find only partial support for the hypothesis that the Anglo-Saxon labor
market is characterized by higher wage mobility than the continental one. Similarily, Maasoumi
and Trede (2001) and Aaberge et al. (2002) find that earnings mobility is higher in Germany
and in the Scandinavian countries than in the US. On the contrary, Burkhauser et al. (1997)
find remarkable similarity in the degree of wage mobility in Germany and in the US. Cardoso
(2006) as well as Clark and Kanellopoulos (2013) find no evidence of a systematic relationship
between the type of labor market institutions and the degree of low pay persistence. Hence,
the question of the influence of the instutional framework on wage mobility is still open. It is
reasonable to assume that different features of the labor market have distinct and perhaps coun-
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tervailing effects on wage mobility. In the present work, we analyze wage mobility in Germany
and in the UK; these countries are selected because they are among the largest economies in
Europe and because they represent different labor market models. As mentioned above, the
British labor market is characterized by high flexibility (Cardoso 2006, Dustmann and Pereira
2008, Chen 2009, Aristei and Perugini 2015), whereas Germany has been historically characte-
rized by a high degree of labor market regulation (Abraham and Housman 1993, Siebert 1997,
Burkhauser et al. 1997). Nevertheless, when relying on aggregate mobility indices, Germany
appears to have a somewhat larger degree of income mobility than the UK (Ayala and Sastre
2007). The analysis of the impact of each labor market feature on wage mobility lies beyond the
scope of the present paper. Our aim, instead, is to assess which groups are more or less mobile
in each of the two countries and whether wage mobility changed after the recent financial crisis.
We propose a methodological innovation, by applying a functional copula model20 in which
positional persistence is represented by an autoregressive function which depends on both the
past wage rank and on some individual characteristics. Until now, wage mobility has mostly
been studied by means of transition matrices; however, such matrices rely on some unrealistic
assumptions, such as individual homogenity or time-invariant transition probabilities from one
quantile to another. This is the reason why, in the present work, we will present such transition
matrices only as exploratory data analysis. We build on the work by Bonhomme and Robin
(2009), who use a Plackett copula to analyze the joint dynamics of the present and past wage
ranks. In their model, however, changes in mobility across the wage distribution are determi-
ned by the parametric copula chosen, rather than by underlying economic dynamics. Previous
studies often found evidence that the degree of wage mobility is not constant across the wage
distribution (e.g. (Hungerford 1993, Jarvis and Jenkins 1995, Gottschalk 1997, Cardoso 2006,
Raferzeder and Winter-Ebmer 2004, Pavlopoulos et Al. 2007, Germandt 2009). The impor-
20This model has been extensively described in Naguib and Gagliardini (2016).
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tance of nonlinear modelling of wage dynamics has also been recently stressed by Altonji et al.
(2013), Arellano and Bonhomme (2017) and Arellano et al. (2017). This further supports our
choice of a semi-nonparametric model for the estimation.
Wage mobility before and after the financial crisis
To the best of our knowledge, the analysis of how wage mobility patterns changed during the
Great Recession (2007-2009) has never been attempted in the previous literature and in general
empirical evidence on the impact of a financial crisis on wage mobility is rather scarce. Aristei
and Perugini (2015) and Fields et al. (2015), for example, only investigate the degree of ear-
nings mobility in the pre-crisis period, whereas Gregg et al. (2015) do not distinguish between
pre- and post-crisis period. Inequality was on the rise in the US well before the financial crisis
broke out (Wisman 2013) and the UK (as well as many other advanced economies) witnessed
a similar trend starting from the ’70s (Bell and Van Reenen 2013). Moreover, Bell and Van
Reenen (2013) find evidence that, in the UK, the Great Recession left the earnings of those
at the very top of the distribution almost unchanged. On the other hand, Cockx and Ghirelli
(2016) find evidence that financial crisis (2007-2009) seriously worsened the career prospects
of young graduates in a rigid labor market (Belgium). According to Rinne and Zimmermann
(2012 and 2013) and to Caliendo and Hogenacker (2012), the German model showed remar-
kable resilience during the Great Recession also thanks to the major labor market reforms that
had been introduced in 2003-2005. Implemented in four waves, the Hartz reforms led to the
restructuring and downsizing of unemployment benefits and social assistance schemes, whe-
reas fixed-term contracts and agency work were massively deregulated. Consequently, German
employment remained almost unaffected during the Great Recession, despite a sharp decline in
GDP in 2008-2009. (Dustmann et al. 2014). On the contrary, employment dropped by about
2% in 2009-2010 in the UK (Rinne and Zimmermann 2013). Indeed, according to Eichhorst
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et al. (2010), the impact of the crisis in terms of employment rate varied much across different
countries, irrespectively to GDP losses, due to differences in labor market institutions. Until
now, emphasis has been given to the analysis of the impact of the Great Recession on the ab-
solute wage level or on the employment rate (e.g. Chodorow-Reich 2013). To the best of our
knowledge, a comprehensive analysis on the influence of the crisis on the degree of relative
wage mobility for different groups of workers (defined by age, gender, education and nationa-
lity) has never been performed in the previous literature. The remaining of the present paper is
structured as follows. Section 2 will present the model used for estimation, Section 3 will be
devoted to a preliminary descriptive data analysis, whereas in Section 4 there will be the the
description and comment of the estimation results and Section 5 will conclude.
3.2 The model
In this Section, we aim at summarizing the main theoretical results of Naguib and Gagliardini
(2016). We are interested in the analysis of the dynamics of the joint process (Zi,t,Wi,t), where
Zi,t stands for the cross-sectional Gaussian individual rank in the wage distribution and Wi,t =
β′Xi,t is the (univariate) score, i.e. a weighted sum of the individual explanatory variables.
In the following, N stands for the total number of individuals in the sample. The processes
{(Zit,Wit), t ∈ N, i = 1, ..., N} are i.i.d. across individuals. Let us define Zt = (Z1,t, ..., ZN,t).
We want to study the joint distribution of the Gaussian rank Zit and of the (standardized) score
Wit. The sample density is:
l(ZT ,WT ) =
N∏
i=1
l(Zi,T ,Wi,T ) =
N∏
i=1
T∏
t=1
l(Zi,t,Wi,t|Zi,t−1,Wi,t−1) (3.1)
where Zi,t−1 = (Zi,t−1, Zi,t−2, Zi,t−3, ...) and ZT = (ZT , ZT−1, ZT−2, ...). In the remaining
of this section, for explanatory purpose, we omit the subscript i. We then assume Granger
non-causality from Z to W , that Wt is Markovian of first-order and strictly stationary and that
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l(Zt|Wt, Zt−1) = l(Zt|Wt,Wt−1, Zt−1). Note that, to ensure stationarity of the score, only
strictly stationary explanatory variables Xt are included in it. These assumptions allow us to
focus on the two conditional densities, which are the transition density of the rank given the
score:
l(Zt|Zt−1,Wt,Wt−1) (3.2)
and the transition density of the score:
l(Wt|Wt−1). (3.3)
The second of these two transition laws is exogenously given, hence we will exclusively fo-
cus on the first one (equation (2)). The details of the derivation are presented in Naguib and
Gagliardini (2016). These two laws define a stationary process for (Zit,Wit), which will be cha-
racterized by a certain joint stationary law (implied by the model): l(Zt,Wt). The conclusion
to be ensured is that the stationary density of the Gaussian ranks is standard normal:
Zt ∼ N(0, 1) (3.4)
Let us suppose that g(·; θ), θ ∈ Θ, is a family of probability density functions (p.d.f.), and that
G(·; θ), θ ∈ Θ is the corresponding family of cumulative distribution functions (c.d.f.). Let
l(Wt) be the stationary distribution of Wt. Under the following two additional hypothesis:∫
g(Z; θ(W ))l(W )dW = φ(Z) (3.5)
and:
l(Zt|Zt−1,Wt,Wt−1) = g(Zt; θ(Wt))c[G(Zt; θ(Wt)), G(Zt−1; θ(Wt−1)); ρ(·,Wt)], (3.6)
where c(·; ·; ρ) is a generic copula density, φ is the standard normal density and θ(W ) is a
function of W , it is possible to show that equation (3.4) holds. The proof of this result is
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reported in Naguib and Gagliardini (2016). We conclude that, conditional on Wt, the copula of
(Zt, Zt−1) is c(·; ·; ρ(Wt)). Our results hold for any copula.
Until now we have shown how to specify a joint dynamics of rank Zt and score Wt, the functi-
ons θ(·) and l(·) which satisfy standard Gaussian distribution of the ranks by using a generic
copula function. As shown by Naguib and Gagliardini (2016), a flexible nonparametric family
of copula functions to be used in this setting can be written as follows. Let us consider the
nonlinear autoregressive dynamics:
Zt = Λ(ρ(Zt−1) + εt) (3.7)
where by hypothesis εt ∼ IIN(0, 1), Λ is a strictly monotonic function and ρ is a function
that expresses the dependence between the past and the present individual ranks. The larger the
value of the partial derivative of the function ρ(·) with respect to the past rank, the higher the
degree of positional persistence. Wt is the score, as defined above. Under the condition that
Λ(k) is such that
Φ(Λ(k)) =
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(k − ρ(Zt−1))φ(Zt−1)dZt−1, (3.8)
the invariant distribution of Markov process (Zt) isN(0, 1) (the proof is reported in Naguib and
Gagliardini 2016). Equation (3.8) implies that Λ is a function of ρ(·). We can now derive the
explicit copula density of Zt and Zt−1. The copula p.d.f. is:
c(u, v; ρ(·)) = φ[Λ
−1(Φ−1(u))− ρ(Φ−1(v))]
φ(Φ−1(u))λ(Λ−1(Φ−1(u)))
, (3.9)
for the arguments u, v ∈ [0, 1]. This copula family is parametrized by the autoregressive
function ρ(·). Note that our results hold for any function ρ(·). Hence, we can easily intro-
duce the score Wt: ρ(·) = ρ(·,Wt) and c(u, v; ρ(·)) ≡ c(u, v, ρ(·,Wt)).
We now consider an adequate measure of positional mobility. We start from the conditional
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expectation:
E(Zit|Zi,t−1,Wit,Wi,t−1) =
∫ ∞
−∞
G−1
(
Λ˜[ρ˜(G(Zi,t−1; θ(Wi,t−1));Wit) + ε]
)
φ(ε)dε,
where Zit = G−1(Uit; θ(Wit)) ⇐⇒ Uit = G(Zit; θ(Wit)), and this variable Uit follows the
stochastic representation Uit = Λ˜[ρ˜(Ui,t−1;Wit) + εit] (see Naguib and Gagliardini (2016)),
where ρ˜(u;Wit) = ρ(Φ−1(u),Wit) and Λ˜(k;Wit) =
∫ 1
0
Φ(k − ρ˜(v;Wit))dv.
So that we can compute the partial derivative with respect to the past rank, which stands for
positional mobility:
∂E(Zit|Zi,t−1,Wit,Wi,t−1)
∂Zi,t−1
=
∫ ∞
−∞
1
g
[
G−1
[
Λ˜[ρ˜(G(Zi,t−1; θ(Wi,t−1));Wit) + ε]
]] ·
Λ˜′[ρ˜(G(Zi,t−1; θ(Wi,t−1));Wit) + ε] · ρ˜′(G(Zi,t−1; θ(Wi,t−1));Wit) · g(Zi,t−1; θ(Wi,t−1)) · φ(ε)dε.
(3.10)
3.3 Data and exploratory analysis
Our dependent variable is gross annual wage. Similarly to what has been done by Bonhomme
and Robin (2009), we define individual annual wage as the sum of two components, a permanent
one and a transitory one. In order to get the individual Gaussian ranks, we follow the same
procedure that has been applied in Naguib and Gagliardini (2016), i.e. we first regress log
earnings on age and the ratio of experience to age minus 15 (the threshold for active population)
in order to purify earnings from the permanent component, and then we study the evolution over
time of the transitory component alone. This preliminary estimation is perfomed via the panel
data fixed-effect technique, in order to adequately take into account the potential presence of
unobserved heterogeneity across workers. We also include in this regression a time fixed-effect
(λt) in order to take into account all the time-fixed effects, among them also the impact of
inflation on wages.
Wagei,t = β1Ageit + β2
Experienceit
Ageit − 15 + ηi + λt + i,t (3.11)
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where Wagei.t stands for log earnings, ExperienceitAgeit−15 is the proportion of years of activity in labor
market to age in excess of 15, ηi represents the individual fixed effect and i,t is the transitory
wage component. From the residuals of this preliminary regression, we obtain the Gaussian
wage ranks via the following formula:
Zi,t = Φ
−1(Fˆt(ˆi,t)) (3.12)
We then compute earnings ranks using the empirical cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of
earnings residuals, Fˆt, and we apply the quantile function of the standard normal distribution,
Φ−1, to impose standard gaussianity (Gottschalk 1997, Moffitt and Gottschalk 2002, Kalwij
and Alessie 2007, Bonhomme and Robin 2009). Following Bonhomme and Robin (2009),
we drop observations for students, retirees and self-employed worker. In addition we only
include observations relative to full-time employees, in order to limit the role of variations in the
intensive margin of labor supply on wage dynamics (Bonhomme and Robin 2009, Bachmann et
al. 2016). We consider individuals aged between 15 and 64, since these are the usual thresholds
for the definition of the active population.
Table 6: Summary statistics
British data
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Mean age 40 41 42 42 43 43 42 43 44 44 45 44
Mean log wage 9.821 9.859 9.913 9.943 9.979 10.015 10.083 10.100 10.129 10.138 10.199 10.206
Variance log wage 0.259 0.282 0.271 0.261 0.269 0.283 0.291 0.275 0.291 0.290 0.294 0.266
n. of obs. 11’018 11’018 9902 9336 6397 7979 6362 6362 4560 2199 2961 4164
German data
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Mean age 42 43 43 44 44 44 44 45 45 45 45 46
Mean log wage 10.407 10.394 10.422 10.424 10.433 10.446 10.443 10.456 10.497 10.513 10.533 10.555
Variance log wage 0.238 0.246 0.242 0.250 0.244 0.246 0.259 0.261 0.252 0.261 0.247 0.246
n. of obs. 5588 5588 5121 5067 4598 4671 4521 4521 4838 5709 5886 5504
This table reports some summary statistics for age and log wage for each of the two countries
considered, both before and after the crisis.
We perform this analysis on two different data sources. For the United Kingdom, we consider
data from the British Labor Force Survey (BLFS), whereas for Germany we take data from
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the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Then, for both countries we construct two sub-
samples, one for the pre-crisis period (2002-2007) and one for the post-crisis period (2009-
2014). For the UK, the sample size (n ∗ T ) is equal to 43’448 observations for the pre-crisis
period and 24’197 observations for the post-crisis period. In the German case, we have a sample
size (n ∗ T ) equal to 25’037 for the first period and 26’449 for the second one. This division
into sub-samples is aimed at understanding whether wage dynamics in any of the two countries
considered changed after the recent financial crisis. Table 6 contains some descriptive summary
statistics on the samples considered. As explorative data analysis, in the remaining of this
Section we perform some preliminary estimates with methods traditionally used in mobility
studies, such as transition matrices and multinomial logit models. However, as explained in
the previous Section, we will then resort to a more flexible specification, in order to more
precisely assess the degree of individual positional persistence, conditional on some explanatory
variables. In Tables 7 and 8 we report the transition matrices obtained on German data for
the years 2005-6 and 2010-11. We notice that the German labor market is characterized by a
substantial degree of decile immobility, since most of the observations lie on the main diagonal
of the matrix in both cases. Before the crisis (2005-6) it seems that it was somewhat easier to
exit from the poorest decile, since 30% of people being there in 2002 were no more in the same
decile in the following year. On the contrary, for the years 2010-11 we find that only about 20%
of workers managed to escape from the lowest-paid decile of the distribution.
With reference to British data (Table 9 and 10) we find similar results. In both countries, indeed,
the percentage of stayers, i.e. workers remaining in the same decile after a year, are far higher
than those of people experiencing upward or downward mobility. Moreover, in both countries
the percentage of stayers is highest in the bottom and in the upper deciles, whereas it is lower in
the middle of the distribution. In the UK, we notice that the percentage of stayers in the bottom
decile remained almost unchanged before and after the crisis, whereas the percentage of stayers
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in the highest decile slightly increased. However, as explained before, this type of analysis
only provides a first insight on the dynamics of the labor market, but could hide intra-decile
wage mobility. Indeed, with transition matrices it is not possible to obtain information on the
individual rank dynamics.
Table 7: Decile transition matrix: Germany pre-crisis
2003 / 2002 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.699 0.200 0.042 0.025 0.019 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.002
2 0.091 0.569 0.196 0.085 0.028 0.016 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.045 0.103 0.547 0.196 0.067 0.028 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.000
4 0.038 0.046 0.172 0.519 0.133 0.040 0.022 0.020 0.006 0.002
5 0.015 0.031 0.070 0.227 0.452 0.128 0.046 0.015 0.015 0.000
6 0.009 0.016 0.037 0.096 0.163 0.443 0.145 0.072 0.012 0.007
7 0.002 0.011 0.009 0.028 0.082 0.194 0.496 0.144 0.024 0.011
8 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.011 0.033 0.059 0.206 0.518 0.140 0.024
9 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.004 0.017 0.039 0.141 0.683 0.102
10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.007 0.013 0.120 0.850
This table reports the empirical transition probabilities from one decile to another between 2005
and 2006 in Germany. The sample size is n=4598.
Table 8: Decile transition matrix, Germany post-crisis
2011 / 2010 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.808 0.138 0.027 0.012 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000
2 0.165 0.531 0.190 0.062 0.021 0.019 0.007 0.004 0.000 0.002
3 0.039 0.129 0.449 0.265 0.052 0.041 0.013 0.011 0.000 0.002
4 0.025 0.049 0.186 0.482 0.145 0.073 0.027 0.008 0.004 0.000
5 0.011 0.027 0.063 0.175 0.389 0.225 0.069 0.023 0.015 0.002
6 0.008 0.010 0.033 0.040 0.163 0.443 0.228 0.060 0.018 0.000
7 0.008 0.010 0.014 0.029 0.070 0.170 0.482 0.164 0.045 0.008
8 0.008 0.010 0.002 0.008 0.016 0.043 0.186 0.482 0.227 0.018
9 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.014 0.035 0.164 0.647 0.124
10 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.027 0.135 0.818
This table reports the empirical transition probabilities from one decile to another between 2010
and 2011 in Germany. The sample size is n=4100.
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Table 9: Decile transition matrix, UK pre-crisis
2005 / 2006 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.687 0.176 0.039 0.031 0.019 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.006 0.019
2 0.219 0.446 0.205 0.078 0.027 0.009 0.007 0.001 0.003 0.004
3 0.067 0.217 0.406 0.198 0.067 0.024 0.013 0.006 0.002 0.002
4 0.033 0.094 0.181 0.407 0.176 0.067 0.020 0.015 0.005 0.003
5 0.019 0.034 0.079 0.165 0.432 0.177 0.065 0.018 0.010 0.002
6 0.008 0.017 0.033 0.075 0.166 0.455 0.160 0.056 0.022 0.008
7 0.006 0.004 0.015 0.031 0.060 0.189 0.440 0.189 0.051 0.016
8 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.022 0.048 0.157 0.524 0.199 0.031
9 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.009 0.015 0.022 0.042 0.168 0.571 0.159
10 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.017 0.041 0.144 0.777
This table reports the empirical transition probabilities from one decile to another between 2005
and 2006 in the UK (BLFS data). The sample size is n=6397.
Table 10: Decile transition matrix, UK post crisis
2011 / 2010 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.661 0.233 0.051 0.016 0.012 0.010 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.004
2 0.189 0.511 0.205 0.057 0.018 0.014 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
3 0.057 0.155 0.514 0.204 0.042 0.013 0.013 0.000 0.002 0.000
4 0.022 0.060 0.172 0.507 0.161 0.049 0.020 0.007 0.002 0.000
5 0.018 0.022 0.062 0.222 0.422 0.191 0.047 0.004 0.011 0.000
6 0.004 0.009 0.011 0.057 0.196 0.510 0.148 0.046 0.013 0.004
7 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.024 0.065 0.254 0.457 0.117 0.059 0.007
8 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.020 0.055 0.243 0.517 0.137 0.020
9 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.013 0.023 0.051 0.148 0.582 0.173
10 0.011 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.002 0.021 0.144 0.805
This table reports the empirical transition probabilities from one decile to another between 2010
and 2011 in the UK (BLFS data). The sample size is n=4560.
As a further exploratory analysis, we also run some multinomial logit estimates on both samples.
We construct a dependent variable which takes value 1 in case of relative upward mobility, it
is equal to -1 in case of relative downward mobility and zero otherwise. We define relative
upward mobility as a situation in which the individual Gaussian rank in year t is greater than
the Gaussian rank of the same individual in year t − 1 and vice versa for relative downward
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mobility. The estimation results (reported in Appendix B) show that education and the past
rank are relevant drivers of wage mobility. However, in these estimates we do not take into
acount the size of the rank change (if we were to include all the possibile values of the rank
change, then the algorithm would not converge). This is the reason why in the following we
resort to the full model presented in the previous Section.
3.4 Estimation results
3.4.1 Estimation strategy
As mentioned above, we estimate a copula model in which mobility is represented by a function
of the past rank and of some explanatory variables, in order to take explicitly into account the
fact that the degree of mobility may differ across the wage distribution. The model is estimated
in a semi-nonparametric way, with the method of sieves (Chen 2007). We assume that the
data is independent across the i index (i.e. that different individuals are i.i.d.). As explanatory
variables, we consider age, gender and a qualitative variable representing the highest education
level achieved by the individual (Bonhomme and Robin 2009). We also include a dummy
which takes value 1 if the individual is foreign-born. All these variables are strictly exogenous
and stationary (age has been de-trended). Recall from Section 3.2 that W 0it = X
′
i,tβ, i.e. the
score or index is a weghted sum of the individual explanatory variables. Let G(Zi,t;X ′i,tβ1) be
the distribution of the rank, conditional on the individual variables, and c[·, ·, ρ(·)] the copula
density. The univariate conditional distributions are estimated via a kernel single-index model.
We estimate the coefficients β1 with a Maximum Likelihood approach:
argmaxβ1
∑
t
∑
i
log gˆ−(it)(Zi,t|β′1Xit)I{Zit,Xit}∈S. (3.13)
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where gˆ−(it)(z|w) is the estimated conditional kernel density, wjt(β1) = β′1Xjt, Zjt represents
the Gaussian rank and K is a standard Gaussian p.d.f.:
gˆ−(it)(z|w; β1) =
1
h
∑
t
∑
j,j 6=iK
(
Zjt−z
h
)
K
(
wˆjt(β1)−w
h
)
∑
t
∑
j,j 6=iK
(
wˆjt(β1)−w
h
) . (3.14)
With this procedure, we obtain an estimator of the betas that is consistent under some regularity
conditions (see Chapter 2). By plugging in this estimate of the betas, the desired estimated
c.d.f. can be easily recovered by integration. Let us now resort to the estimation of the copula
function, c(·, ·, ρ(·, X ′i,tβ2)), which is performed via the following Sieve Maximum Likelihood
procedure:
max
θ∈ΘN
N∑
i=1
l(Yi, θ) (3.15)
l(Yi, θ) ≡
T∑
t=1
logc[Uˆi,t, Uˆi,t−1, ρ(Zi,t−1, X ′i,tβ2)] (3.16)
where Yi = (Zit, Xit, t = 1, ..., T ). We have θ = (β2, ρ) ∈ B2×H ≡ Θ, ΘN = B2×HN where
HN is a bivariate sieve space whose dimension depends onN . Moreover, Uˆi,t = Gˆ(Zi,t;X ′i,tβˆ1),
Uˆi,t−1 = Gˆ(Zi,t−1;X ′i,t−1βˆ1) are the estimated (empirical) c.d.f. of the present and of the
past Gaussian ranks, conditional on the individual explanatory variables, and c(u, v; ρ(·,Wt))
is the copula density presented in equation (3.9) of Section 3.2. We estimate the function
ρ(Zi,t−1, X ′i,tβ2) non-parametrically via the method of sieves and λ is the vector of coefficients
of the polynomial basis used to approximate ρ(·):
ρ(Zt−1,Wt) ≈
m∑
k,l=0
λk,lHk(Wˆit)Hl(Zi,t−1) (3.17)
The number of Hermite polynomials used to approximate the autoregressive function depends
on the dimension of the sample: m = m(N) (Chen 2007). Convergence of this estimator has
been proved in Gagliardini and Naguib (2016) for N →∞ and T fixed.
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3.4.2 Estimation results on the German sample
As explained above, we apply the model presented in Section 3.2 to the German data (GSOEP)
for the pre-crisis (2002-2007) and for the post-crisis period (2009-2014). We obtain the follo-
wing estimates of the autoregressive function.
Figure 19: Constrained estimate of the function ρ(Zi,t−1,Wi,t), Germany pre-crisis (left) and
post-crisis (right)
This figure shows the three-dimensional representation of the autoregressive function. This
function has been approximated with a Hermite basis of degree 2.
The function ρ(·) is always increasing in the past rank in both periods, as expected; this means
that, the higher the past rank, the higher is the expected present rank, conditional on the set
of explanatory variables considered. From Figure 19, we deduce that the score plays a more
relevant role in determining individual positions in the distribution after the crisis than before
it. In the left side panel of Figure 19, indeed, we notice that the present Gaussian rank is
only slightly increasing in the score in the lower part of the wage distribution. This means, for
117
example, that low-paid younger workers are more likely to end up in a high rank than their older
colleagues with the same past rank. Since different individual explanatory variables are likely to
have a countervailing impact on the autoregressive function ρ(·) and on the degree of individual
rank mobility, in the remaining of this Section we compute the mobility measure defined by
equation (3.10) for different groups of workers, in order to be able to analyze the impact of
each variable on the degree of positional mobilty. Each panel in Figures 20-21 represents the
mobility measure presented in the previous Section in equation (3.10), for workers of the same
age with different individual characteristics (education level, gender or the fact of being foregin-
born), before and after the crisis. In Figures 20-21 and in Figures 23-24, the y-axis records
indeed this mobility measure. The larger this quantity is, the higher is the association between
the present and the past rank and hence the lower the degree of positional mobility is. this is
the reason why the y-axis is labelled as ’immobility”. Note that, since the mobility pattern of
40-year-old workers almost fully coincide, for all education levels, with those of 60-year-old
workers, we omit the mobility pattern of the older group, in order to improve the readibility
of the graphs. Moreover, only some education levels have been represented in the graphs for
reasons of brevity and readibility. The summary of our findings on the mobility patterns for all
the age and education groups both in Germany and in the UK is reported in Table 11 and in Table
12. For the pre-crisis period, we notice that positional mobility in Germany is decreasing in the
past rank for individuals both in their 20s and in their 40s, almost regardless their education
level. This finding suggests that young and middle-aged workers are not subject to the so-
called low-wage trap. Even if they are currently occupying a rather low rank in the wage
distribution, indeed, their degree of rank persistence is rather low and hence they have rather
high probabilities of ending up in a higher rank in the following year; this is consistent with
Clark and Kanellopoulos (2013), who find evidence of a low degree of low pay persistence in
Germany for the period 1994-2001.
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The higher degree of positional persistence at the upper end of the wage distribution suggests
that, once a worker has reached a high position, the risk of experiencing downward mobility
is moderate. Education does not seem to have a significant role in shielding workers from
the low-wage trap, since the degree of positional mobility at the bottom of the distribution
for workers who achieved different educational qualification is almost identical. We further
notice that, among young workers, females and individuals who only completed professional
middle school are more mobile at the top of the distribution. This suggests that they are more
exposed to the risk of downward mobility, with respect to their male colleagues who achieved
apprenticeship. However, this finding does not hold any more among workers in their 40s;
on the contrary, middle-aged female workers are less mobile than their male colleagues at the
top of the distribution. Lastly, we note that the fact of being foreign-born does not seem to
significantly influence the individual patterns of positional mobility.
If we look at the estimation results after the crisis in Germany, we notice that education seems
to have lost its role as a driver of positional mobility. For the post-crisis period in Germany, the
mobility patterns of the different age groups for different education levels are rather close to
each other and almost fully overlap. We now find that young workers (in their 20s) are far less
mobile than their older colleagues at the bottom of the distribution, this suggests that this age
group is exposed to the risk of being stuck in a low-wage trap after the crisis. Gender differences
in the mobility patterns have disappeared after the crisis. Moreover, the fact of being foreign-
born has lost its significant role in determining the degree of individual mobility. Considering
the workers in their 40s and 60s, their degree of mobility appears as more stable across the
distribution than it was before the crisis, i.e. the value of the partial derivative is almost constant
for different values of the past rank. This suggests that, for these age groups, the importance of
the past rank in determining individual mobility diminished after the financial crisis.
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Figure 20: Mobility patterns, Germany pre-crisis (top panel) and post-crisis (bottom panel),
20-years old workers
In this figure we display the immobility measure defined in equation (3.10) for different groups of workers. On the
x-axis the past rank is reported, whereas the y-axis measures rank (positional) immobility. If this partial derivative
is low, this means that the association between present and past ranks is low and hence the degree of rank mobility
is high. On the contrary, if the value of the partial derivative is high, this means that the association between the
present and the past ranks is close, and hence the degree of rank mobility is low. The shaded areas represent the
95% pointwise confidence intervals for the partial derivatives and have been obtained by bootstrapping.
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Figure 21: Mobility patterns, Germany pre-crisis (top panel) and post-crisis (bottom panel),
40-years old workers
In this figure we display the immobility measure defined in equation (3.10) for different groups of workers. On the
x-axis the past rank is reported, whereas the y-axis measures rank (positional) immobility. If this partial derivative
is low, this means that the association between present and past ranks is low and hence the degree of rank mobility
is high. On the contrary, if the value of the partial derivative is high, this means that the association between the
present and the past ranks is close, and hence the degree of rank mobility is low. The shaded areas represent the
95% pointwise confidence intervals for the partial derivatives and have been obtained by bootstrapping.
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3.4.3 Estimation results on the British sample
Similarly to what we did above for the case of Germany, in this Section we compare mobility
patters before and after the Great Recession for different groups of workers in the UK. From
Figure 22, we immediately notice that the shape of the autoregressive function differs from that
obtained in the German sample. In the British case the estimated autoregressive function is
closer to a flat surface, especially in the post-crisis period. In both countries, the autoregressive
function is always increasing in the past rank. Moreover, in the UK this estimated function is
U-shaped in the score for middle and low past ranks, whereas it is almost flat, regardless the
value of the score, for the highest past ranks.
Figure 22: Constrained estimate of the function ρ(Zi,t−1,Wi,t), United Kingdom pre-crisis (left)
and post-crisis (right)
This figure shows the three-dimensional representation of the autoregressive function. This
function has been approximated with a Hermite basis of degree 2.
We observe from Figure 22 that the shape of the function did not dramatically change after
2007. It seems that the impact of the crisis on positional mobility was smaller in the UK than in
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Germany. In order to better understand the implications of this change in the shape of the auto-
regressive function, let us consider, as it has been done above for Germany, the pattern of our
mobility measure, as defined by equation (3.10). This measure, computed for different groups
of individuals (defined by age, gender, education level and the fact of being foreign-born or not)
before and after the crisis in the UK, is reported in Figures 23 - 24. Differently from the case of
Germany, here we observe that age has almost no significant role in determining the degree of
individual positional mobility. For all the education groups, the patterns of our mobility mea-
sure computed for different age groups often overlap. In the UK, mobility is always decreasing
in the past rank and the degree of positional mobility is generally higher than what we found
for Germany, in particular for workers in their 20s after the crisis. Neither education nor the
fact of being foreign born play a relevant role in determining positional mobility in the UK and
this holds both for the pre-crisis and the post-crisis period. We notice that female workers who
completed apprenticeship are less mobile than their male colleagues in the middle-upper part
of the distribution; this holds for all age groups, both before and after the crisis, and suggests
that female employees face a lower risk of downward mobility than their male colleagues once
they have reached a high position in the distribution. Before the crisis, young workers who only
completed the lowest educational level were characterized by higher mobility at the top of the
distribution and hence a higher risk of falling back in the wage distribution in the following
years. However, this pattern disappeared after the crisis.
In Germany, the change in the mobility patterns following the crisis was more dramatic than in
the UK. As mentioned in Section 3.1, indeed, the UK are characterized by a more flexible labor
market than Germany, in particular with less strict hiring and firing rules. Hence, it is likely
that, in the UK, adjustments in the aftermath of the financial crisis took place both in terms of
wages and in terms of employment, with the result that the influence of the crisis on the degree
of wage mobility was smaller in the UK than in Germany.
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Figure 23: Mobility patterns, United Kingdom pre-crisis (top panel) and post-crisis (bottom
panel), 20-years old workers
In this figure we display the immobility measure defined in (3.10) for different groups of workers. On the x-axis
the past rank is reported, whereas the y-axis measures rank (positional) immobility. If this partial derivative is
low, this means that the association between present and past ranks is low and hence the degree of rank mobility
is high. On the contrary, if the value of the partial derivative is high, this means that the association between the
present and the past ranks is close, and hence the degree of rank mobility is low. The shaded areas represent the
95% pointwise confidence intervals for the partial derivatives and have been obtained by bootstrapping.
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Figure 24: Mobility patters, United Kingdom pre-crisis (top panel) and post-crisis (bottom
panel), 40-years old workers
In this figure we display the immobility measure defined in equation (3.10) for different groups of workers. On the
x-axis the past rank is reported, whereas the y-axis measures rank (positional) immobility. If this partial derivative
is low, this means that the association between present and past ranks is low and hence the degree of rank mobility
is high. On the contrary, if the value of the partial derivative is high, this means that the association between the
present and the past ranks is close, and hence the degree of rank mobility is low. The shaded areas represent the
95% pointwise confidence intervals for the partial derivatives and have been obtained by bootstrapping.
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On the other hand, in Germany wage was the main channel of adjustment to the new economic
conditions, and this is the reason why we witness non-negligible changes in the wage mobility
patterns before and after the crisis. In Germany, indeed, some groups of young workers witnes-
sed a decrease in mobility in the low part of the distribution after the crisis (namely, workers
in their 20), whereas the mobility degree of all the age groups remained almost unchanged af-
ter the crisis in the UK. Our findings support the hypothesis that the institutional context plays
a fundamental role in determining the degree of relative wage mobility of different groups of
workers in an economy and how the mobility patterns change after a shock. Our main findings
are summarized in Table 11 and 12 below.
Table 11: Overview: the more mobile groups
Before the crisis After the crisis
Germany
20-year-old male workers with
professional middle school
40-year-old workers with
any education
UK
20-year-old male workers with
level 2 NQ/NV or below
20-year-old male workers
with any education
This table provides a summary of the groups that exhibit the highest positional mobility, i.e. the
lowest values of our mobility measure defined in equation (3.10), in the two countries conside-
red, before and after the crisis.
Table 12: Overview: the less mobile groups
Before the crisis After the crisis
Germany
20-year-old foreign-born workers
with high past rank
20-year-old workers at the extremes
of the distribution, any education
UK
40-year-old female workers with
high past rank
40-year-old female workers with
high past rank
This table provides a summary of the groups that exhibit the lowest positional mobility, i.e. the
lowest values of our mobility measure defined in equation (3.10), in the two countries conside-
red, before and after the crisis.
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3.5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we analyzed wage mobility before and after the Great Recession in two European
countries, Germany and the UK. We find evidence that the mobility patterns of different age
and education groups of workers dramatically changed from 2002-7 to 2009-14 in Germany,
but not in the UK. It emerges that, after the crisis, young workers being in a low rank were less
mobile than their older colleagues in Germany, and that the crisis caused for them an increase
in the risk of being stuck in the low ranks. On the other hand, the degree of mobility of all the
age and education groups remained almost unchanged in the UK. The financial crisis had only
a limited impact on positional mobility patterns in the UK, whereas it had stronger effects in
Germany.
The finding of a higher degree of wage mobility in Germany than in the UK is consistent with
the work of Shimer (2012). According to Shimer, indeed, if wages are rigid, the negative effect
of a shock (here: the financial crisis) on employment will be more long-lasting. Germany is
often taken as an example of a country whose employment rate fully bounced back after the
crisis. A rather high degree of wage mobility may have contributed to make this recovery possi-
ble. With the innovative estimation method used, i.e. a functional copula estimated by means of
semi-nonparametric methods, we are able to estimate the value of the autoregressive function
which links the present and the past individual wage rank for each individual in every point
of the wage distribution. As mentioned above, we notice that the shape of this autoregressive
function, which is different in each country, notably changed in Germany after the crisis, whe-
reas remained rather close to its previous shape in the UK. Further developments of this research
may include a deeper analysis of some of the factors at the roots of cross-country differences in
wage mobility, i.e. some specific features of the institutional framework, or the structure of the
national pension system.
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Appendix A Copula models21
Joe (1997) and Nelsen (1999) provide extensive surveys on copula theory. A copula function
couples marginal distributions to get a joint distribution. By definition, a joint cumulative
function C on [0; 1]2 with uniform marginal distributions on [0, 1] is a copula. Thus, a function
C : [0; 1]2 → [0, 1] is a copula if the following conditions hold:
C(0, v) = C(u, 0) = 0,∀u, v ∈ [0, 1] (3.18)
C(1, v) = v, C(u, 1) = u,∀u, v ∈ [0, 1] (3.19)
21This Appendix heavily relies on Naguib and Gagliardini (2016), Appendix D.
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For any rectangle R = [u1, u2]× [v1, v2] ⊂ [0; 1]2 the following holds:∫ ∫
C(du, dv) = C(u2, v2)− C(u1, v2)− C(u2, v1) + C(u1, v1) ≥ 0. (3.20)
When the distribution C is continuous, the associated density is called the copula density:
c(u, v) =
∂2C(u, v)
∂u∂v
, u, v ∈ [0, 1]. (3.21)
Sklar’s theorem (1959)
Let F (x, y) be the bivariate c.d.f. of random variables X and Y , with marginal c.d.f. equal to
Fx and Fy. Let then U = Fx(X) and V = Fy(Y ). The joint c.d.f. is given by:
P (U ≤ u, V ≤ v) = P (X ≤ F−1x (U), Y ≤ F−1y (V )) = F (F−1x (u), F−1y (v)), ∀u, v ∈ [0, 1]
(3.22)
Then there exists a copula such that:
C(u, v) = F (F−1x (u), F
−1
y (v)),∀u, v ∈ [0, 1] (3.23)
i.e.F (x, y) = C[Fx(x), FY (y)] ∀x, y.
This copula is unique if F is a continuous distribution. Assuming sufficient regularity, it is
possible to obtain the following conditional c.d.f.:
P (U ≤ u | V = v) = ∂C(u, v)/∂v (3.24)
The conditional density function is obtained by deriving once more with respect to u. The
copula is limited by the so-called Frechet-Hoeffding bounds; the upper bound is: CU(u, v) =
max(u+v−1; 0), while the lower bound is: CL(u, v) = min(u, v). In the case of independence
we have CI(u, v) = u · v. There are many different families of copulas, for example the
Gaussian, the Frank or the Gumbel.
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Appendix B Additional estimates
Table 13: Multinomial logistic regression, Germany
Downward mobility 2002-2007 2009-2014
Age .0320 (.1022) -.0646 (.0662)
Age2 -.0007 (.0011) .0010 (.0012)
Female dummy .2622 (.2646) -.4376* (.2408)
High school diploma -.9792*** (.3077) -.3975 (.2866)
Professional high school diploma -.4523 (.5112) -.1496 (.4351)
Apprenticeship -.3704 (.3037) -.2107 (.3185)
Foreign-born .2533 (.7293) -.3050 (.7278)
Past Gaussian rank .3688*** (.1302) -.1061 (.1392)
Constant 5.0891** (2.3064) 7.1340*** (2.0710)
Upward mobility 2002-2007 2009-2014
Age .0712 (.1022) -.0417 (.0663)
Age2 -.0012 (.0011) .0003 (.0012)
Female dummy .0902 (.2646) -.5668** (.2410)
High school diploma -.5782* (.3077) -.0759 (.2869)
Professional high school diploma -.1811 (.5114) .0880 (.4355)
Apprenticeship -.5027* (.3038) -.1766 (.3188)
Foreign-born .1073 (.7298) -.1470 (.7277)
Past Gaussian rank -.0604 (.1302) -.4534*** (.1394)
Constant 4.2404* (2.3073) 6.4557 (2.0736)
LR chi2(16) 584.44 338.63
Log likelihood -12063.129 -11875.137
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
N. obs. 25’037 26’449
This table reports the results of a multinomial logistic regression in which the dependent vari-
able is the change in the Gaussian wage rank. This variable takes value 1 if the present rank is
higher than the past rank, value -1 if the present rank is lower than the past rank and value zero
if the two ranks are identical. This estimate has been performed on GSOEP data, seprately for
the pre-crisis period (left column) and for the post-crisis period (right column).
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Table 14: Multinomial logistic regression, United Kingdom
Downward mobility 2002-2007 2009-2014
Age -.0252 (.1399) .0080 (.2050)
Age2 -.0002 (.0017) -.1693 (.3715)
Female dummy -.0806 (.3335) -.1693 (.3715)
Level 3 NQ/NV .2462 (.5324) .6431 (.6562)
Trade apprenticeship .3916 (.7694) .4064 (1.0575)
Level 4 NQ/NV and above -.1841 (.3854) .0210 (.4344)
Foreign-born -.5466 (.5283) -.0459 (.4268)
Past Gaussian rank -.3081* (.1787) -.0374 (.2050)
Constant 7.8275*** (2.8484) 6.8064** (3.3097)
Upward mobility 2002-2007 2009-2014
Age -.3839*** (.1398) -.3285** (.1574)
Age2 .0050*** (.0017) .0043** (.0018)
Female dummy -.1817 (.3336) -.2676 (.3716)
Level 3 NQ/NV .3362 (.5326) .6932 (.6563)
Trade apprenticeship .3974 (.7695) .3973 (1.0574)
Level 4 NQ/NV and above .1964 (.3856) .3115 (.4346)
Foreign-born -.5908 (.5288) -.0520 (.4269)
Past Gaussian rank -.7720*** (.1789) -.4408** (.2051)
Constant 13.1095*** (2.8481) 11.4767*** (3.3091)
LR chi2( 16) 8350.95 5193.79
Log likelihood -26230.765 -14357.139
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
N. obs. 43’448 24’197
This table reports the results of a multinomial logistic regression in which the dependent vari-
able is the change in the Gaussian wage rank. This variable takes value 1 if the present rank is
higher than the past rank, value -1 if the present rank is lower than the past rank and value zero
if the two ranks are identical. This estimate has been performed on BLFS data, seprately for the
pre-crisis period (left column) and for the post-crisis period (right column).
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4 Rank matters: an analysis of relative wage mobility as a
neglected determinant of job satisfaction
4.1 Introduction
22 Job satisfaction is an important variable in social sciences, since it is a good predictor of
individual well-being (Cabral Vieira 2005) and it is positively related to worker’s productivity
(Freeman 1977). The analysis of the factors determining the employee’s level of job satisfaction
have been widely studied by the past literature (e.g. Millan et al. 2013). However, some specific
aspects still need investigation.
The aim of the present paper is to assess the influence of rank or positional wage mobility
on individual job satisfaction. Whereas in the past literature the role of the absolute wage
level as a driver of individual well-being or job satisfaction has often been put under scrutiny
(see e.g. Easterlin 1995, Clark 1999, Clark and Oswald 1996, Judge et al. 2010), on the
contrary economists have almost never included income ranks among the arguments of the
utility function. Nevertheless, human beings are deeply interested in rankings (Brown et al.
2008). In this paper we want to put under test the hypothesis that workers care about their
degree of relative (rank) wage mobility, i.e. that their job satisfaction is directly influenced by
their prospects of going up or down in the wage distribution over time.
Some researchers have tried to investigate the impact of changes in the absolute wage level on
subjective well-being or on individual job satisfaction (for example see Diener et al. (1993),
Clark and Oswald (1996), Clark (1999), Leontaridi and Sloane (2004), Di Tella et al. (2010))
and have found sometimes contrasting results. For example, Diener et al. (1993) finds no sound
econometric evidence of an influence of social comparison based on absolute wage changes in
the determination of individual well-being. On the contrary, Clark and Oswald (1996) claim
that such comparison effects exist and are highly relevant. However, in these studies wage
22We would like to thank Thierry Kamionka and Sebastien Roux (CREST, Paris) for their insightful advice.
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mobility has always been defined uniquely as the change in the absolute level of pay, i.e. they
only considered absolute wage mobility.
In the literature, there are two main approaches to wage mobility; the first one considers the
growth rate of wages and salaries from one year to the following one (absolute mobility). The
second one, instead, refers to the concept of relative or positional mobility. Suppose that all
workers in a given country and in a given year are ranked according to their gross annual wage;
the study of their relative mobility is the analysis of how their individual position (rank) in
the distribution, i.e. with respect to the other workers, changes across time (Jantti and Jenkins
2013). Just to make an example, it is possible for a worker to experience absolute wage mobility,
without experiencing, at the same time, relative wage mobility. This happens when all wages
rise or decline in the same proportion. Rank is usually regarded as a fundamental variable
in fields such as sport economics (see for example Macmillan and Smith, 2007) or education
economics (e.g. for the university rankings, see Marginson and Van der Wende 2007). The
importance of the income rank for individual well-being, despite being recognized since the
seminal work of Parducci (1965) in the field of cognitive psychology (Brown et al. 2008, Boyce
et al. 2010), has been until now rather neglected in the economic literature on job satisfaction.
According to the range frequency theory, developed by Parducci in 1965, satisfaction will be
predicted partly by the ordinal position of a wage within a comparison set, i.e. by the individual
rank. Therefore, we expect that there is a significant association between relative wage mobility
and job satisfaction. On the other side, we expect absolute wage mobility to have only a limited
role in determining the degree of individual satisfaction.
To the best of our knowledge, rank (or relative) wage mobility has never been included among
the determinants of job satisfaction in the past literature. Indeed, the analysis of the individual
rank as a determinant of individual (life) satisfaction has remained until now almost in the
exclusive domain of psychology. On the contrary, it has been rather neglected in the fields of
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labor economics. A first preliminary test of the range frequency theory has been performed
by Brown et al. (2008). We extend their work in the following ways; first, the authors only
consider the static, point-in-time individual rank in the wage distribution among the explanatory
variables of individual satisfaction. We build on their approach by including different measures
of relative wage mobility among the determinants of job satisfaction. Moreover, we extend
the work by Brown et al. (2008) by using national survey data instead of experimental data,
and thus having the opportunity of investigating the influence of relative wage mobility on job
satisfaction on a larger scale, by considering a comprehensive measure of job satisfaction as
our dependent variable and by employing panel data instead of a cross-section. Note that, when
talking about relative wage mobility, we are not referring to the theory of relative or reference
income. By relative or positional wage mobility, indeed, we mean the change in the individual
ranks in the wage distribution from one year to the following one, as it will be explained in
greater detail in Section 4.2. On the other hand, the relative or reference income theory claims
that individual well-being not only depends on her absolute wage level, but also on her wage
compared to some reference income measure (i.e. the average wage in a group of friends or
colleagues, see e.g. Clark and Oswald (1996), Stutzer (2004), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005)). An
empirical test of the reference income theory lies beyond the scope of the present paper. Instead,
our focus consists in testing the range frequency theory, i.e. the importance of rank and in
particular of rank changes (which we consider as a measure of relative wage mobility), as
an alternative explanation of the link between wage and job satisfaction. Wage mobility may
affect job satisfaction in two ways: first, since people are generally risk-averse, they prefer to
earn a stable income over time. Therefore, the higher wage mobility is, the lower reported job
satisfaction will be; this is the so called wage insecurity aspect (Fachinger and Himmelreicher
2010, Gottschalk and Spolaore 2002). On the other hand, wage mobility is often linked to the
concept of equality of opportunity. If wage mobility in the lowest ranks of the distribution is
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high, low-paid workers are able to improve their positions from one year to the following one
(Friedman 1962, Clark 2003, Clark et al. 2009). The degree of individual tolerance for current
levels of income inequality will be higher, since workers will expect a future improvement in
their relative income position in the distribution (Bjornskov et al. 2013). Hence, in principle,
the sign of the impact of wage mobility on job satisfaction may be either positive or negative.
This is the reason why it makes sense to include both absolute and relative wage mobility among
the determinants of job satisfaction. The remainder of the present paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 will present the data and the estimation methods used. Section 3 will be devoted to
the presentation and discussion of the estimation results and Section 4 will conclude.
4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Model
Our dependent variable is indivudual self-assessed job satisfaction. In the previous literature,
much attention has been devoted to the analysis of the influence of income on subjective well-
being or on so-called general life satisfaction (e.g. Diener 1993, Clark and Oswald 1996,
McBride 2001, Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005). However, individual well-being is a multifaceted
concept, which includes several aspects such as satisfaction with own health, job satisfaction
or satisfaction with free time. General life satisfaction is a variable that has more informative
value for the psychologists than for the economists. On the contrary, since the seminal work of
Freeman (1978), the importance of job satisfaction in the economic analysis has been establis-
hed. Indeed, the previous literature has found a clear negative relationship between the level
of employee job satisfaction and the turnover rate within a firm (e.g. among the most recent,
Brunetto et al. 2010 and Yucel 2012). Moreover, the existence of a negative and statistically
significant relationship between the turnover rate and the firm profitability has also been proved
(Staw 1980, Mobley 1982, Mowday et al. 1982, Darmon 1990, Hom and Griffeth 1995, Ton and
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Huckman 2008). Therefore, firms have a strong interest in the study of the influence of wage
mobility on job satisfaction, since the latter variable is directly associated with their profitability.
In addition, by considering a broad concept such as general life satisfaction as the dependent
variable there is a rather high risk of incurring in omitted-variable bias or endogeneity (for ex-
ample, health status can both influence and be influenced by subjective well-being). On the
other hand, the main drivers of job satisfaction, a narrower idea than life satisfaction, have been
largely investigated and identified by the economic literature (e.g. Hamermesh (1977), Borjas
(1979), Akerlof, Rose and Yellen (1988), Clark (1999)), hence the risk of omitted-variable bias
should be lower. Moreover, psychologists claim that utility from work is one of the most impor-
tant parts which constitute an individual’s utility (Clark 1999). Therefore, in the present paper
we will assume separability of the utility function in its work and non-work-related determi-
nants and we will focus on the first group. Following the previous literature on the theme of job
satisfaction, we will estimate a model of the form:
JSit = β
′Xit + αWageMobilityit + εit (4.1)
Where JSit stands for reported job satisfaction, Xit is a vector of individual or job-related cha-
racteristics, such as age, gender, civil status, percentage of occupation or firm size and sector,
whereas WageMobilityit is one of our measures of wage mobility, which will be defined in
the remainder of this Section, β is the vector of coefficients of the control variables (to be esti-
mated), α is our main estimating coefficient of interest, and εit ∼ N(0, 1) is the classical error
term. As mentioned above, we aim at analyzing the impact of wage mobility on job satisfaction.
We consider two kinds of earnings mobility measures; the first one refers to absolute mobility
and is defined as the individual growth rate of wage from one year to the following one. Our
second measure refers to the concept of relative or positional mobility (Jantti and Jerkins 2013);
for each year, we rank individuals in the sample according to their wage. Their position in the
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wage distribution in a given year is called rank; by dividing this number by the sample size in
that year, we find the uniform rank (Uit), i.e. an index that is uniformly distributed between zero
and one. Finally, we apply to the uniform ranks the quantile function of the standard normal
distribution, in order to obtain the Gaussian ranks, Zit:
Zit = Φ
−1(Uit) (4.2)
This last transformation is performed for consistency with the previous two chapters. The hig-
her the value of the Gaussian rank, the higher the position occupied by the individual in the
sample wage distribution in a given year. We define relative wage mobility as the change in the
individual Gaussian rank from one year to the following one:
RelativeWageMobilityit = ∆Zit = Zit − Zit−1 (4.3)
Given the ordinal nature of our dependent variable and in the wake of the previous literature on
job satisfaction, the estimation method employed is the random-effects ordered probit.
4.2.2 Data
We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for the years 1985-2012; the
total number of observations in this unbalanced panel is equal to 164’058. We choose to ana-
lyze the German labor market, since Germany is the largest economy in continental Europe. As
usual in the literature, we eliminate all the observations with zero annual income (in addition
to all those for which information on wages was missing); we trim data on the basis of age,
so that only observations of people between 15 and 64 years of age are included (these are
the usual thresholds to describe active population). We further exclude students, apprentices,
self-employed individuals and people who are reported as ”working only irregularly” or unem-
ployed. Note that in the definition of individual income we do not include bonuses, nor other
forms of windfall earnings. In the wake of the past literature, we consider as determinants of job
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satisfaction the following explanatory variables: the logarithm of annual individual labor ear-
nings (”wage, salaries from main job”), annual work hours, work experience (as measured by
the number of years spent working full time), gender, age, age squared, education as measured
by the number of years spent in school, marital status, the number of children in the house-
hold, the State of residence (Bundesland), change of job23, employment level of the individual
(part-time dummy), size of the firm, sector (NACE) and type of occupation (with more or less
decisional autonomy). This last variable takes values from 1 (”No decisional autonomy at all”)
to 5, which stands for the largest possible degree of decisional autonomy at the workplace.
Table 15 below reports some descriptive statistics of the main variables included in the model.
All the variables related to individual satisfaction are measured and recorded in the GSOEP
dataset with a scale ranging from zero (not satisfied at all) to ten (fully satisfied), which makes
the use of the ordered model a natural choice for the estimation.
23Of course, the decision of quitting a job is influenced by the degree of individual job satisfaction, hence the
variable standing for job change may be in principle endogenous (if the change of job is voluntary). In order to
solve this problem, we take a lag of this variable, i.e. our explanatory variable stands for the presence of a job
change in the previous year, instead than in the present year.
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Table 15: Descriptive statistics of selected variables, GSOEP data, 1985-2012 (164’058 obs.)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 41.622 10.553 17 64
Female dummy 0.423 0.494 0 1
Married dummy 0.681 0.466 0 1
Part time work dummy 0.22 0.414 0 1
Change of job dummy 0.1 0.3 0 1
Size of the firm (20-200 employees) 0.294 0.456 0 1
Size of the firm (201-2000 employees) 0.242 0.428 0 1
Size of the firm (more than 2000 employees) 0.261 0.439 0 1
Number of children in the household 0.728 0.98 0 10
Years of education 12.112 2.702 7 18
Total annual work hours 2065.769 586.235 52 7445
Total annual wage (in euros) 26633.05 16754.95 42 300000
Years of full time working experience 16.871 11.082 0 49.6
Decisional autonomy at work 2.646 1.098 1 5
Job satisfaction 6.663 2.348 0 10
4.3 Results and discussion
4.3.1 The effect of (absolute and relative) wage mobility on job satisfaction
Table 16 presents the estimation results of different model specifications. From Estimations 1-6
in Table 16, we find evidence that the estimated coefficient attached to relative wage mobility
is positive and highly statistically significant (at a 99% confidence level) in all model speci-
fications. This means that positional improvements (i.e. increases in the individual Gaussian
ranks) are associated with a higher probability of reporting higher levels of job satisfaction. On
the other hand, a worsening in the individual relative position (i.e. a decrease in the individual
Gaussian rank over time) is associated with a lower probability of experiencing high levels of
job satisfaction. This constitutes a first evidence that relative wage mobility is an important
driver of satisfaction at the workplace. This effect is still relevant after we control for the abso-
lute wage level. In Table 16, both equation (2) and (5) estimate the influence of relative wage
mobility on job satisfaction, with the difference that in equation (5) the logarithm of total an-
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nual wage is added to the explanatory variables. From the estimation results, we deduce that
the coefficient of relative wage mobility is almost identical in equation (2) and in equation (5).
Hence, positional improvements have a positive value to the individual per se, regardless the
absolute level of the wage earned in a year.
The relevance of our relative mobility measure in the job satisfaction equation is consistent with
the previous literature. In particular, we find empirical support for the range frequency theory
developed by Parducci (1965), according to which the position (rank) in the wage distribution
is one of the main drivers of individual job satisfaction. In both equation (1) and (4) in Table 16,
the only mobility measure included in the estimating equation is absolute wage mobility. The
difference between these two estimations is that in equation (4) the logarithm of annual wage is
included among the explanatory variables. From equation (1) and equation (4) in Table 16, we
find evidence of a positive relationship between absolute wage mobility (i.e. percentage wage
growth in a year) and the probability of reporting higher levels of job satisfaction. This finding
is consistent with Clark (1999). However, when both mobility measures (relative and absolute
wage mobility) are included in the model, i.e. in equation (6) and in equation (3) (respectively
with and without log wage included among the explanatory variables), we find that both esti-
mated coefficients are statistically significant. This provides further support to the hypothesis
that these two measures correspond to different mobility concepts, each of which has a poten-
tially different impact on individual job satisfaction. It is also worth noting that, when both
absolute and relative wage mobility are included in the model, the estimated coefficient atta-
ched to absolute mobility is negative, whereas that attached to relative mobility is positive (this
holds in different model specifications, i.e. both with and without the logarithm of total annual
wage among the explanatory variables). According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) people
are loss averse, i.e. their decrease in utility due to a monetary loss is larger than the increase
in utility following a monetary gain of the same size. This may explain why people dislike
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absolute wage mobility: the prospect of a potential monetary gain is more than compensated by
the prospect of an equivalent potential monetary loss (Clark 2011). This is the reason why, once
relative mobility has been included in the estimating equation, we find evidence of a negative
and statistically significant relationship between absolute wage mobility and the probability of
recording high levels of job satisfaction. On the other hand, relative wage mobility is positively
associated to the probability of recording higher levels of individual job satisfaction in all the
model specifications in Table 16 (i.e. with and without absolute wage mobility included among
the explanatory variables), thus suggesting that the relationship between relative wage mobility
and individual job satisfaction is robust.
To obtain further insights on the role of relative mobility as a driver of job satisfaction, in equa-
tion (7) reported in Table 16 we consider an alternative measure of relative wage mobility. In
this last model specification, we take as a determinant of job satisfaction the absolute value of
the change in the Gaussian ranks from one year to the following one. This means that we take
the absolute value of the variable standing for relative wage mobility in equations (1)-(6) in
Table 16. The estimation results show that there is a positive and statistically significant relati-
onship (at a 99% confidence level) between this new variable (i.e. the absolute value of the rank
change) and the probability of experiencing higher levels of job satisfaction. This means that
positional mobility is perceived as a value per se by the workers. A higher degree of positional
mobility is often associated with more flexible career patterns and greater opportunities of clim-
bing the wage scale. Moreover, if the individual is currently employed in a low-pay job, higher
relative (positional) mobility means that there are higher chances for him or her to escape the
so-called low-wage trap. As mentioned in the introduction, a labor market in which there is
a higher degree of relative wage mobility is commonly perceived by the workers as more fair,
since it should be characterized by a greater equality of opportunity.
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Table 16: Estimation results, random-effects ordered probit model
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Abs. mobility 0.0110*** - -0.0044* 0.0111*** - -0.0043* -
(% change) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0026)
Rel. mobility 1 - 0.0618*** 0.0682*** - 0.0618*** 0.0681***
(0.0054) (0.0067) (0.0054) (0.0062)
Rel. mobility 2 - - - - - - - 0.0254***
(Alternative def.) (0.0074)
Prob >Wald chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Number of obs 164’058 164’058 164’058 164’058 164’058 164’058 164’058
The dependent variable is job satisfaction in all the estimations reported in Table 2. (1) Only absolute mobility.
(2) Only relative mobility. (3) Both absolute and relative mobility. (4) Only absolute mobility, with log of annual
income among the control variables. (5) Only relative mobility, with log of annual income among the control
variables. (6) Both absolute and relative mobility, with log of annual income among the control variables. (7) In
this equation the absolute value of our measure of relative mobility (i.e. change in the Gaussian ranks) has been
included in the model as the unique wage mobility measure.
Indeed, relative downward mobility represents a worsening of the individual position in the
wage distribution, but does not necessarily imply a decrease in the absolute wage level. Rela-
tive wage mobility is perceived as a value by the workers and hence has a positive impact on the
probability of reporting higher levels of job satisfaction. As a robustness check, we performed
the estimates with robust standard errors, in order to take into account the possibility of hetero-
geneity, and no significant changes in the estimation results were found (results not reported for
reasons of brevity). In order to be able to analyze in greater detail the impact of both absolute
and relative mobility on job satisfaction, in Table 17 below we computed the marginal effects of
our variables of interest on the probability of reporting each of the 11 job satisfaction levels for
the main estimations of Table 16. From these results, we notice that in estimations (1)-(2) the
marginal impact of relative wage mobility is about five times larger than that of absolute wage
mobility. Moreover, from estimation (3) we deduce that the marginal impact of relative wage
mobility is around fifteen times larger than that of absolute wage mobility. When only one wage
mobility measure (either absolute or relative) is introduced in the estimated equation (n. (1)-(2),
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(5) and (7) in Table 3 below), we find that wage mobility has a negative marginal effect on the
probability of experiencing low to middle satisfaction levels (from zero to seven). On the other
hand, it has a positive marginal effect on the probability of recording the three highest levels of
satisfaction. As mentioned before, the effect of a marginal change in the relative wage mobility
measure (i.e. difference in the Gaussian ranks from one year to the following one) is on average
around ten times larger than the effect of a marginal change in the annual growth rate of wage
(absolute mobility).
Table 17: Marginal effects, random-effects ordered probit model
1 2 3 3 5 7
Abs mob Rel mob Abs mob Rel mob Rel mob Rel mob (2)
Pr(Satisf)=0 -0.0002*** -0.0013*** 0.0001* -0.0014*** -0.0013*** -0.0005***
(0.00004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Pr(Satisf)=1 -0.0004*** -0.0024*** 0.0002* -0.0027*** -0.0024*** -0.0010***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Pr(Satisf)=2 -0.0003*** -0.0015*** 0.0001* -0.0017*** -0.0015*** -0.0006***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Pr(Satisf)=3 -0.0005*** -0.0026*** 0.0002* -0.0028*** -0.0026*** -0.0011***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Pr(Satisf)=4 -0.0006*** -0.0031*** 0.0002* -0.0035*** -0.0031*** -0.0013***
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Pr(Satisf)=5 -0.0012*** -0.0067*** 0.0005* -0.0074*** -0.0067*** -0.0028***
(0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008)
Pr(Satisf)=6 -0.0008*** -0.0044*** 0.0003* -0.0049*** -0.0044*** -0.0018***
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Pr(Satisf)=7 -0.0004*** -0.0021*** 0.0002* -0.0023*** -0.0021*** -0.0009***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Pr(Satisf)=8 0.0017*** 0.0093*** -0.0007* 0.0103*** 0.0093*** 0.0038***
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0011)
Pr(Satisf)=9 0.0016*** 0.0091*** -0.0006* 0.0100*** 0.0091*** 0.0037***
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0011)
Pr(Satisf)=10 0.0010*** 0.0057*** -0.0004* 0.0063*** 0.0058*** 0.0024***
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007)
The dependent variable is job satisfaction in all the estimations. Numbering of the estimations is the same as
in Table 2. (1) Only absolute mobility. (2) Only relative mobility. (3) Both absolute and relative mobility. (5)
Only relative mobility, logarithm of annual income included among the control variables. (7) In this equation the
absolute value of our measure of relative mobility (i.e. change in the Gaussian ranks) has been included in the
model as the unique wage mobility measure.
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Let us now consider the estimations in which both mobility measures are included, i.e. equa-
tions (3) and (6) in Table 16. In this case, we are able to disentangle the marginal effects of
relative wage mobility from those of its absolute counterpart. Indeed, from Table 17 (estima-
tion (3)), we deduce that absolute mobility has a positive marginal effect on the probability of
experiencing low and middle levels of job satisfaction, whereas it has a negative marginal effect
on the probability of reporting the three highest satisfaction levels (from 8 to 10). The reverse is
true for relative wage mobility. From equation (3) we find evidence that relative wage mobility
has a negative marginal impact on the probability of having a level of job satisfaction below
8, whereas it has a positive impact on the probability of recording a satisfaction level equal or
greater than 8. The same result is confirmed if we consider an alternative definition of relative
wage mobility, as it has been done in equation (7) in Table 16 and 17. As explained above, in
this estimation we consider the absolute value of the change in Gaussian ranks from one year
to another as a measure of relative wage mobility. In this last case, we still find that there is
a positive association between relative wage mobility and the probability of having one of the
three highest job satisfaction levels.
These findings provide further evidence that relative or positional wage mobility (also called
rank mobility) is linked to the idea of equality of opportunity and hence it positively influences
the degree of self-assessed job satisfaction of the worker. On the other side, absolute wage
mobility, once it is disentangled from its relative counterpart, is negatively related to job sa-
tisfaction, because individuals are loss averse (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The estimation
results reported in Table 16 and 17 confirm the hypothesis that relative wage mobility is a rele-
vant determinant of individual satisfaction at the workplace. Estimation results for the control
variables are broadly consistent with the previous literature and are only reported in Appendix
A for reasons of brevity. For example, we find evidence that job satisfaction is increasing in the
number of children (Forgionne and Peeters 1982) and that is quadratic in age (Clark and Os-
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wald 1996). Moreover, our estimates show that job satisfaction is lower for married individuals
(Agho et al. 1993) and higher for those with higher decisional autonomy and who completed
higher education levels (see e.g. Mottaz 1984, Lee and Wilbur 1985 and Rogers 1991). Land
and sector dummies have also been included among the explanatory variables.
4.3.2 Robustness checks
As additional robustness checks, we performed some other estimations, in which alternative
definitions of relative wage mobility were used. In particular, we tried to assess whether the
reference group of the individual corresponds to the entire sample or it is smaller. In estimations
(1)-(3) reported in Table 18 below, relative wage mobility is defined in the same way as it was in
estimations (1)-(6) of Table 16 (i.e. the change in the Gaussian rank from one year to another).
Here, however, the individual rank is not computed on the whole sample, but it represents how
the individual position changed in a year whitin a restricted group of workers.
In estimation 1 in Table 18, for each worker in the sample this reference group consists of the
100 workers immediately below and the 100 immediately above the individual. In estimation
2 this group is extended to the 250 workers below and the 250 workers above and finally in
estimation 3 we consider the 500 workers above and the 500 workers below each individual.
The idea is that people could care more about mobility whitin a restricted group of people that
are close to them in the wage distribution, rather than about their position in the whole wage
distribution.
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Table 18: Robustness checks, random-effects ordered probit model
1 2 3
Rel. mobility 0.0345*** 0.0589*** 0.0340***
(0.0028) (0.0051) (0.0028)
Prob >Wald chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Number of obs 163’858 163’558 163’058
The dependent variable is job satisfaction in all the estimations reported in Table 4. (1) Reference group of 200
people. (2) Reference group of 500 people. (3) Reference group of 1000 people.
However, from our estimation results reported in Tables 18 and 19, we find evidence that both
the sign and the size of the influence of these alternative definitions of wage mobility on job
satisfaction are rather close to those found in the previous Section (Table 16 and 17). It appears
that relative wage mobility, either defined with respect to the full sample or with respect to a
smaller group of workers, has a positve and highly statistically significant impact on individual
job satisfaction. The marginal effect of relative wage mobility on the probability of recording
the different values of job satisfaction is rather close in the different estimations (both those
reported in Table 17 and those in Table 19).
The differences in the marginal effects of relative wage mobility on job satisfaction, depending
on the size of the reference group used, are almost negligible. The estimated coefficients for the
control variables reported in Table 18 are rather close, both in sign and in size, to those obtained
in the estimations presented in Table 16, and are only reported in Appendix A for reasons of
brevity. The estimation results reported in Table 18 and 19 provide further evidence of the
robustness of our main estimation results, which have been presented in the previous Section.
153
Table 19: Marginal effects, robustness checks, random-effects ordered probit model
1 2 3
Pr(Satisf)=0 -0.0007*** -0.0012*** -0.0007***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Pr(Satisf)=1 -0.0014*** -0.0023*** -0.0013***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Pr(Satisf)=2 -0.0009*** -0.0015*** -0.0009***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Pr(Satisf)=3 -0.0014*** -0.0024*** -0.0014***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Pr(Satisf)=4 -0.0018*** -0.0030*** -0.0017***
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001)
Pr(Satisf)=5 -0.0037*** -0.0064*** -0.0037***
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003)
Pr(Satisf)=6 -0.0025*** -0.0042*** -0.0024***
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002)
Pr(Satisf)=7 -0.0012*** -0.0020*** -0.0011***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Pr(Satisf)=8 0.0052*** 0.0089*** 0.0052***
(0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0004)
Pr(Satisf)=9 0.0051*** 0.0086*** 0.0050***
(0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0004)
Pr(Satisf)=10 0.0032*** 0.0055*** 0.0032***
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003)
The dependent variable is job satisfaction in all the estimations. (1) Reference group of 200 people. (2)
Reference group of 500 people. (3) Reference group of 1000 people.
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4.4 Conclusions
In this paper, we aimed at assessing the relationship between relative wage mobility and indivi-
dual job satisfaction. Whereas the past literature exclusively focused on the role of the absolute
income level and on that of absolute wage mobility in determining job satisfaction, we claim
that also relative or rank mobility matters, i.e. how the individual position in the wage distribu-
tion changes over time, relative to that of the other workers. In order to do this, we construct a
measure of relative wage mobility, which is based on rank change. By the word rank, we mean
the individual position in the wage distribution at a given point in time.
In all the different model specifications, we find that the coefficient attached to relative wage
mobility is positive and highly statistically significant. Even after controlling for the logarithm
of total annual income and for a measure of absolute mobility (i.e. the annual rate of wage
growth), the positive impact of relative mobility on job satisfaction remains significant at a
99% confidence level. Our results are also robust to different definitions of the reference group
considered for the computation of the ranks. The marginal effect of a change in relative wage
mobility is around ten times bigger than the marginal effect of a change in absolute wage mo-
bility; this provides a further indication of the relevance of our variable of interest as a driver
of individual job satisfaction. Moreover, we defined an alternative variable standing for relative
wage mobility. This new variable is equal to the absolute value of the Gaussian rank change and
we find evidence that it is, too, positively related to the probability of recording higher levels
of job satisfaction. This suggests that relative wage mobility is perceived as an advantage by
the worker, in the sense of allowing the transition towards better-paid jobs. This is the reason
why the presence of relative mobility itself is associated with higher job satisfaction in our es-
timation results, i.e. high relative mobility is associated with high levels of job satisfaction and
vice versa. Our results are entirely consistent with the range frequency theory (Parducci 1965,
Brown et al. 2008, Boyce et al. 2010), which suggests that people not only care about their
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income and its evolution over time, but also about their rank, i.e. their position within a group
of workers and about the evolution of their rank from one year to the following one. Note that
we also found evidence that the whole wage distribution constitutes a relevant reference group
for the individual. Indeed, job satisfaction turns out to be directly and significantly influenced
by positional mobility, i.e. rank change within the entire wage distribution.
The implications of these results are manifold. From the employer’s viewpoint, in order to
keep the workers motivated it is not enough to ensure that their wages grow over time, but it
is also necessary that there is an adequate degree of rank or relative wage mobility within the
organization. A low degree of relative wage mobility, with some workers permanently lagging
behind in the wage distribution, indeed, is likely to cause more dissatisfied and hence less
productive employees. On the other hand, from a policy-making viewpoint, it clearly emerges
that people care about the evolution of their relative position in the wage distribution and not
only about the evolution of their absolute pay level. Therefore, it is of fundamental importance
to advance in the study of the determinants of rank or positional wage mobility and to predispose
policy interventions in order to enhance this type of mobility, in particular at the bottom part of
the wage distribution.
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Appendix A: Full estimation results
Table 20: Estimation results, random-effects ordered probit model
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Female -0.0177 -0.0180 -0.0177 -0.0178 -0.0181 -0.0178 -0.0158
(0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0126)
Age 0.0251*** 0.0259*** 0.0257*** 0.0250*** 0.0258*** 0.0256*** .0248***
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Age2 -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -.0003***
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Married -0.0349*** -0.0337*** -0.0337*** -0.0345*** -0.0333*** -0.0333*** -0.0351***
(0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0096)
N. children 0.0079* 0.0077* 0.0079* 0.0085** 0.0083* 0.0085** 0.0083*
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043)
Education 0.0134*** 0.0132*** 0.0132*** 0.0140*** 0.0137*** 0.0137*** 0.0134***
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Work hours -3.69e-06 -0.00001 -0.00001 -3.40e-06 -0.00001 -0.00001 -1.87e-06
(8.11e-06) (8.13e-06) (8.14e-06) (8.11e-06) (8.14e-06) (8.14e-06) (8.11e-06)
Part time 0.0112 0.0165 0.0173 0.0116 0.0169 0.0177 0.0102
(0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118)
Autonomy 0.0990*** 0.0985*** 0.0983*** 0.0988*** 0.0983*** 0.0981*** 0.0987***
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048)
Size 20-200 0.0154 0.0132 0.0129 0.0155 0.0133 0.0130 0.0155
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104)
Size 200-2000 -0.0011 -0.0032 -0.0036 -0.0011 -0.0033 -0.0037 -0.0009
(0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0116)
Size >2000 0.0006 -0.0020 -0.0023 0.0002 -0.0023 -0.0027 0.0013
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119)
Experience -0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Change of job 0.0842*** 0.0927*** 0.0940*** 0.0843*** 0.0928*** 0.0940*** 0.0813***
(0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098)
Abs. mobility 0.0110*** - -0.0044* 0.0111*** - -0.0043* -
(% change) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0026)
Annual wage - - - -0.0204*** -0.0203*** -0.0202*** -
(log) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062)
Rel. mobility 1 - 0.0618*** 0.0682*** - 0.0618*** 0.0681*** -
(0.0054) (0.0067) (0.0054) (0.0067)
Rel. mobility 2 - - - - - - - 0.0254***
(Alternative def.) (0.0074)
Land dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Prob >Wald chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Number of obs 164’058 164’058 164’058 164’058 164’058 164’058 164’058
The dependent variable is job satisfaction in all the estimations. (1) Only absolute mobility. (2) Only relative
mobility. (3) Both absolute and relative mobility. (4) Only absolute mobility, with log of annual income in the
control variables. (5) Only relative mobility, with log of annual income in the control variables. (6) Both absolute
and relative mobility, with log of annual income in the control variables. (7) Alternative definition of the relative
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Table 21: Robustness checks, random-effects ordered probit model
1 2 3
Female -0.0153 -0.0144 -0.0145
(0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0127)
Age 0.0248*** 0.0251*** 0.0250***
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Age2 -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003***
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Married -0.0349*** -0.0352*** -0.0352***
(0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0096)
N. children 0.0083* 0.0083* 0.0083*
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043)
Education 0.0127*** 0.0127*** 0.0126***
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Work hours -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001*
(8.14e-06) (8.15e-06) (8.18e-06)
Part time 0.0183 0.0165 0.0173
(0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118)
Autonomy 0.0965*** 0.0961*** 0.0966***
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048)
Size 20-200 0.0122 0.0131 0.0127
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104)
Size 200-2000 -0.0053 -0.0046 -0.0058
(0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0116)
Size >2000 -0.0042 -0.0030 -0.0037
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0120)
Experience 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Change of job 0.0952*** 0.0914*** 0.0955***
(0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0099)
Rel. mobility 0.0345*** 0.0589*** 0.0340***
(0.0028) (0.0051) (0.0028)
Land dummies yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Prob >Wald chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Number of obs 163’858 163’558 163’058
The dependent variable is job satisfaction in all the estimations. (1) Reference group of 200 people. (2) Reference
group of 500 people. (3) Reference group of 1000 people.
Note that the negative coefficient attached to log wage in estimations 4-6 reported in Table
20, despite being somewhat surprising, is consistent with the esitmations results of Clark and
Oswald (1996).
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5 Conclusion
In this thesis we presented a new model for the wage rank dynamics. By using the new functi-
onal copula model developed in Chapter 1, we estimated the autoregressive function which
links the present and the past Gaussian ranks, conditional on the individual characteristics. This
semi-nonparametric approach allowed us to have a rather high degree of flexibility in the mo-
dellization, without being prone to the curse of dimensionality. Our estimates show that in the
US for the period 1975-1996 the degree of relative wage mobility was rather high, both for
young and for old individuals whose past rank was in the bottom half of the wage distribution.
This finding endorses the common wisdom of the US being the "land of opportunity" and sug-
gests that workers currently being in low ranks are not likely to remain stuck in a low-wage trap
also in the following year. The degree of positional immobility results rather low for all age and
education groups in the US labor market in the period considered. Education does not seem to
play a relevant role as a driver of the individual patterns of positional mobility. These are the
results that we obtain from a first application of the new functional copula model developed in
Chapter 1 to PSID data. In Chapter 2, we extended the analysis of relative wage mobility to the
comparison between two countries characterized by rather different institutional backgrounds.
Indeed, relative wage mobility has been recognized in the previous literature as a fundamental
feature in an economy. However, to the best of our knowledge, no investigation has been per-
formed up to now about how relative wage mobility changed after the financial crisis started
in 2007. In Chapter 2 we tackled this question. The aim of the chapter was to assess whether
different labor market institutions were at the root of different responses of wage mobility to
the financial crisis. To this aim, we considered the two largest European economies: Germany
and the United Kingdom, and we applied our semi-nonparametric copula model separately to
the pre-crisis and to the post-crisis period in both countries. Our estimation results show that
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the mobility patterns of different age and education groups of workers dramatically changed
between 2002-7 and 2009-14 in Germany. On the contrary, the shape of the estimated autore-
gressive function linking the present and the past rank did not significantly change due to the
crisis in the UK. Our estimates show that, after the crisis, young people being in a low rank were
less mobile than their older colleagues in Germany, and education had lost its role as a driver
of relative wage mobility. On the contrary, the degree of mobility of all the age and education
groups remained almost unchanged before and after the crisis in the UK. We notice from these
results that the financial crisis had only a limited impact on individual patterns of positional
mobility in the UK, whereas it had stronger effects in Germany. It is also worth noting that
the fact of being female was associated with different mobility patterns in Germany before the
crisis, but then this gender-linked difference almost completely disappeared after 2009.
The use of the new semi-nonparametric functional copula model developed in Chapter 1 allowed
us to estimate the value of the autoregressive function linking present and past ranks virtually
for every individual in every point of the wage distribution. This is much more informative
than summary mobility measures that have usually been used in the previous literature, such
as aggregate mobility indices or transition matrices. We are then able to assess that the autore-
gressive function, which is different in each country, changed in Germany due to the financial
crisis, whereas it remained close to its previous shape in the UK. We can therefore suppose that
the presence of a more flexible and less regulated labor market such as the British one allowed
the effects of the crisis to be absorbed in a shorter time frame and/or by different variables (i.e.
employment and not only wage), so that the impact on wage mobility patterns after some years
had already become difficult to identify. On the contrary, in a highly regulated labor market
such as the German one, the effects of the financial crisis on individual relative wage mobility
patterns were more long-lasting, even if Germany showed a higher degree of resilience than the
UK in terms of employment rate during the financial crisis. However, it is still unclear which
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aspects of the institutional framework are more closely linked to the degree of wage mobility.
A deep analysis of the factors at the roots of the cross-countries differences in wage mobility
that we found in Chapter 2 constitutes scope for further research.
However, why is it so important to analyze the drivers of relative wage mobility, instead of
those of its absolute counterpart? Chapter 3 provides a sound answer to this question. In this
last chapter, indeed, we study the relationship between relative wage mobility and individual job
satisfaction. Whereas the past literature exclusively focused on the role of the absolute income
level and on that of absolute wage mobility in determining job satisfaction, we claim that also
relative mobility matters, i.e. how the individual position in the wage distribution changes over
time, relative to that of the other workers. In order to do this, we construct a measure of relative
wage mobility, which is based on rank change. By the word rank, we mean the individual
position in the wage distribution at a given point in time. In all the different model specifications,
we find that the coefficient attached to relative wage mobility is positive and highly statistically
significant. Even after controlling for the logarithm of total annual income and for a measure
of absolute mobility (i.e. annual rate of wage growth), the positive impact of relative mobility
on job satisfaction remains significant at a 99% confidence level. Our results are also robust to
different definitions of the reference group considered for the computation of the ranks. The
marginal effect of a change in relative wage mobility results around ten times bigger than the
marginal effect of a change in absolute wage mobility; this provides a further indication of
the relevance of our variable of interest as a driver of individual job satisfaction. Our results
are consistent with the economic theory, which suggests that people not only care about their
income and its evolution over time, but also about their relative or comparison income, i.e. how
much they earn as compared to the members of a reference group. The concept of relative wage
mobility, i.e. the change of positions in the wage distribution as compared to the other workers,
incorporates this idea of comparison among individuals.
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The results presented in Chapter 3 provide a sound empirical support to the research questions
of both Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, by showing the fundamental role of relative wage mobility
as a key determinant of individual job satisfaction. As a future research development, it would
be interesting to determine in greater detail which kind of wage mobility is more likely to
determine changes in the individual levels of job satisfaction. Once assessed (as it has been
found in Chapter 3 of the present work) that workers care about relative wage mobility, it could
be investigated how broad their reference group is, i.e. whether they care about gaining positions
in the wage distribution with respect, for example to their colleagues working in the same
division, firm, region, or sector.
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